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Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: 
The key role of banks is to provide risk sharing between different types of consumers, 
and the mismatch of short-term liabilities and long-term asset can cause bank runs. In 
this dissertation, I use Diamond-Dybvig framework to analyze some key issues on 
banking: banks and the asset market, bank runs and bailouts, and characteristics of 
deposit contracts.  
The first chapter addresses the coexistence of banks and the asset market.  
Jacklin (1987) showed that banks are redundant if the asset market exists. I show that 
if there is aggregate liquidity shock, then asset prices will be volatile. This will make 
the arbitrage opportunities in the market risky. Sufficiently risk-averse depositors will 
not arbitrage. Hence, incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed, leaving room for 
the bank to provide "insurance" to the depositors.     
The second chapter addresses the relationship between the probability of bank 
runs and bailouts. Following Keister (2010), my model includes both a private good 
and a public good. The major innovation in this paper is to determine the run 
probability by using the global-games approach in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), 
making the run probability endogenous. I show that bailouts increase the ex-ante run 
probability through two channels. The first channel works through the misaligned 
objectives of the bank and the government: Runs are less costly for banks when there 
are bailouts. Hence, banks take on more risk than is socially optimal. The second 
 channel works through the change in the depositor's incentives to run: Bailouts 
increase the probability that a depositor will get her money if she participates in a run, 
thus increasing the likelihood of a run. 
    The third chapter characterizes how optimal deposit contract is related to the 
probability of bank runs. Peck and Shell (2003) show that the optimal deposit contract 
can tolerate bank runs if the run probability is low. In their two-consumer example, the 
deposit contract is a step function of the run probability. I generalize that example and 
show that, for some parameters which permit bank runs, the optimal contract changes 
continuously with the run probability until it reaches the threshold probability level. 
Above that threshold, the optimal contract eliminates bank runs. Hence, the run 
probability affects not only whether bank runs will be tolerated (like Peck and Shell's 
example) but also how bank runs will be tolerated. 
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Introduction
Banking and, more generally, nancial intermediation perform essential roles for the
e¢ cient allocation of resources in modern economies, but they can also be sources
of instability. One such instability is the susceptibility of banks (and other nancial
intermediaries) to runs. A bank run occurs when an abnormally large number of
depositors elect to withdraw their funds, leading to the failure of the bank to meet
its commitments. Bank runs can be triggered by realizations of the bank fundamen-
tals (e.g., poor performance of the banks portfolio or an abnormally large fraction of
depositors receiving liquidity shocks) or merely because of self-fullling panic of the
depositors.
Bank runsare not observed solely at depository institutions. The current nancial
crisis is largely the result of the instability in the shadow banking sector: nancial
rms running on other nancial rms by not renewing sale and repurchase agree-
ments.1 In my dissertation, the formal model is of runs on depository banks, but the
results can be loosely applied for runs generally.
Two di¤erent literatures have been developed to analyze bank runs. The rst follows
the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [hereafter DD], which treats bank
runs as panic-based: Depositors withdraw their funds only because they expect that the
other depositors will do so. Hence, bank runs occur as a result of coordination failure.
The other literature treats bank runs as fundamental-based. In these models (e.g.,
Allen and Gale (1998)), the depositors run because of unfavorable bank fundamentals,
e.g. abnormally poor performance of bank assets. When a depositor decides to run,
he will do so regardless of the other depositorsactions.
In this dissertation, I will employ the DD framework, treating bank runs as purely
1Gorton (2009).
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panic-based. DD provides a workhorse for modelling not only bank runs but also the
essential role of modern banking. The key role of DD banks is to provide risk sharing
between the di¤erent types of consumers. The consequent mismatch of short-term
liabilities and long-term assets can cause bank runs.
To be more precise, the individuals in the DD economy are subject to idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks: they can be either patient or impatient. The impatient agents need to
consume early and the patient agents can wait and consume later. The problem is that
the long-term asset is illiquid: The return on this asset is low if harvested early. With-
out the bank, the impatient agents would have to consume much less than the patient
agents. If an agent is risk-averse, her expected utility can be improved by smoothing
consumption between when she becomes patient and when she becomes impatient. In
other words, insurance against the liquidity shocks is desirable. This insurance cannot
be achieved in the insurance market because of asymmetric information: An agents
type (patient or impatient) is her private information. The bank can provide some
insuranceby o¤ering demand deposit contract: An agent makes her deposit before
she knows her type. After the liquidity shocks are realized, the bank transferssome
of the resources from the patient depositors to the impatient depositors. Although
the bank cannot observe the depositorstypes, the depositors can self-select since the
short-term payment is lower than the long-term payment. What we have described de-
pends on the assumption that the depositors expect that other depositors will not run
on the bank. If a depositor expects that all other depositors withdraw early regardless
of their types, his best response is to withdraw early. This is because the banks assets
would be exhausted in satisfying the early withdrawals. If the depositor waits, she will
get nothing. Hence, a bank run occurs as a result of panic.
In this dissertation, I use the DD framework to analyze three issues in banking and
nance: (1) coexistence of DD banks and asset markets; (2) bank runs and government
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bailouts, and (3) the structure of the optimal deposit contract as a function of the
(exogenous) run-probability.
My rst chapter addresses the coexistence of banks and the asset market. DD
assume that the asset market does not exist. Jacklin (1987) shows that banks are
redundant if we add the asset market to the DD model. That is because the asset
market provides arbitrage opportunities: If the depositors withdraw early, they can
use the withdrawals to buy assets in the market. To make the patient depositors
withdraw late, the late-payment has to be not only larger than the early payment but
also larger than the proceeds from the asset which can be bought in the market by the
early payment. Hence, the arbitrage opportunities tighten the incentive-compatability
constraint which makes the patient and impatient depositors self-select. I extend the
DD model to an environment in which there is an aggregate liquidity shock and in
which agents di¤er in their risk aversions. The aggregate liquidity shock makes asset
prices volatile. Since depositors do not know the realization of the asset price while
making their withdrawals, the arbitrage opportunities in the asset market are risky.
Su¢ ciently risk-averse depositors prefer not to arbitrage in the market. Hence, the
incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed, leaving room for the bank to provide some
insurance to these depositors. Banks are not redundant. But the less risk-averse
agents will still take the risky arbitrage opportunities in the market. Hence, there is no
bank targeting them as its depositors. They will make investments by themselves and
obtain liquidity through the market. In this economy, there is nontrivial coexistence
of banks and markets.
The second chapter addresses the relationship between the probability of bank runs
and bailouts. Following Keister (2010), my model includes both a private good and
a public good. The public good is introduced to represent the social cost of bank
bailouts: Bailouts crowd out public good provision since the government budget must
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be balanced. The major innovation I made is to determine the run probability by using
the global-games approach in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), making the run probabil-
ity endogenous. I show that bailouts increase the ex-ante run probability through two
channels. The rst channel is that the bailouts distort the ex-ante incentives of banks,
increasing the riskiness of their banking contracts. This is because the banks do not
internalize the social cost of a bailouts, the decreased level of public good provision.
Thus, bank runs are less costly for the banks than for the social planner. Anticipating
government bailouts, banks promise a higher short-term deposit interest rate than is
socially optimal in order to attract depositors. The higher short-term deposit interest
rate makes the banking sector more fragile. The second channel is that the antici-
pated bailout increases the depositors probability of getting her money from the bank
when she participates in a run. With the additional resources from the bailout, banks
are provided with extra withdrawal capacity during a run. Hence, if a depositor ex-
pects that a bank run will occur, the anticipated bailout increases the probability of
the depositor getting her money from the bank if she participates in the run. When
a depositor compares her expected utility between withdrawing early or waiting to
withdraw, because of the bailout her incentive to withdraw early is increased and the
ex-ante probability of a run is increased. Knowing the conicts between alleviating
bank runs and preventing bank runs, the government will announce, ex ante, a bailout
policy that balances these two e¤ects.
My third chapter is a note on Peck and Shell (2003). DD show that a bank run
can be an equilibrium in the post-deposit game for the contract which supports the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation. The important question to ask is whether or not con-
sumers will want to deposit in the bank if they expect that a bank run will occur.
Peck and Shell show that under the optimal contract, the post-deposit game can have
a run equilibrium. Given a propensity to run which is triggered by sunspots, the opti-
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mal contract for the full pre-deposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with
small, but positive probability. In Peck and Shells 2-consumer example, the contract
is characterized by c which is the consumption received by the rst depositor in line
in period 1. Let c(s) be the optimal contract o¤ered by the bank, where s is the
sunspot-driven probability of a bank run. In the numerical example of Peck and Shell,
c(s) is a step function: If the probability s is less than a critical level s0, the contract
c(s) tolerates runs and c(s) = c(0). If the probability s is more than s0, the optimal
contract will be immune from runs and c(s) = cno run, the highest level at which
rational consumers will never run. The probability of a bank run s has only a bang-
bange¤ect on the optimal contract c(s). I generalize that example and show that,
for some parameters which permit bank runs, the optimal contract changes continu-
ously with the run probability until it reaches the threshold probability level. Above
that threshold, the optimal contract eliminates bank runs. Hence, the run probability
a¤ects not only whether bank runs will be tolerated (as in Peck and Shells example)
but also how bank runs will be tolerated.
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1 Chapter 1: Banks and Markets: The Roles of
Price Volatility and Risk Aversion
1.1 Introduction
There is typically a trade-o¤ between liquidity and return. Individuals are subject to
liquidity shocks, but the higher return asset is usually illiquid. Banks and the asset
market2 increase economic e¢ ciency beyond autarky by improving the liquidity-return
trade-o¤. The asset market does this by providing individuals with opportunities to sell
their illiquid assets (or claims on future consumption) in the market, as in Allen and
Gale (1994). Banks do this by o¤ering demand deposit contracts as in Bryant (1980)
and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Banks and the asset market also interact with one
another. This paper studies the operation of the DD-type bank in an economy with
an asset market.
The model in this paper has two features: (1) The equilibrium price of the nancial
asset is volatile.3 Hence, the deposit contract o¤ered by the representative bank can
protect the depositors not only from idiosyncratic liquidity shocks but also from the
asset price volatility. (2) There is a separating equilibrium: the agents who are more
risk averse choose to be depositors in the bank and those who are less risk averse trade
in the market.4
The rst feature contributes to the debate concerning the redundancy of the DD-
type bank when the nancial market exists. DD analyzed banking in an economy in
which the liquidity shock is purely idiosyncratic and in which there is no asset mar-
2As other papers in this literature, asset markets are ex-post security markets
3Robert J. Shiller (1981), among others, have argued the prices of nancial assets such as stocks
are characterized by excess volatility.
4In the model, for the CRRA utility function, those who have the coe¢ cient of relative-risk-aversion
greater than 1 will choose to be depositors and those who have the coe¢ cient of relative-risk-aversion
smaller than 1 will choose to participate the market.
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ket. DD showed how the demand deposit contract acts as insurance against the
liquidity shocks. They also show that the rst-best allocation5 can be achieved as
an equilibrium. The incentive-compatibility constraint, which makes depositors with
di¤erent liquidity needs self-select, does not bind at the rst-best allocation. The non-
binding incentive-compatibility constraint relies on the assumption that there is no
asset market and hence ex-post6 arbitrage opportunities for the depositors are limited.
The viability of the DD bank in an economy with an asset market was questioned
by Jacklin (1987);7 von Thadder (1999) elucidated Jacklins critique. If a nancial
market exists, out-of-bank trades will give the depositors more ex-post arbitrage oppor-
tunities and strengthen the incentive-compatibility constraint. For the case of purely
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the prices of nancial assets are stable. The incentive-
compatibility constraint will be strengthened to the point that no room is left for the
bank to provide the insurance against liquidity shocks and the bank can only mimic
the nancial market allocation. The bank is redundant. If EU(i) is the representative
agents expected utility under regime i, then we have:
maxEU(M) = maxEU(M&B) < maxEU(B),
whereM is the only-market regime,M&B is the market-and-bank regime and B is the
only-bank regime. That is, the bank is redundant when there is a nancial market. In
my model, the price of the nancial asset is volatile and I also assume realistically that
asset prices are not revealed until after withdrawals are made.8 Hence, ex-post arbitrage
5First-best allocation is the allocation when there is no asymmetric information.
6By "ex-post", I mean "after a depositor learns his liquidity need".
7Haubrich and King (1990) and Hellwig (1994) also presented models that question the role of
banks when there is a nancial market.
8This assumption is realistic and reects the intuition that individuals cannot predict the market
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opportunities are risky for the depositors, which weakens the incentive-compatibility
constraint. If depositors are su¢ ciently risk averse, the incentive-compatibility con-
straint will leave room for the bank to manipulate the deposit contract which can
partially insure the depositors from the volatility of asset prices. In this way, banks
can increase the expected utility of their depositors. Banks are not redundant.
The non-redundancy of the bank shows the advantage of banking over the pure
asset market economy. Then, the next question is: Why does not everyone deposits in
the bank? The second feature of the model answers this question. Agents are assumed
to di¤er in their attitudes toward risk. Hence, even though the ex-post arbitrage
opportunities are risky, depositors may still want to take those opportunities depending
on their degree of risk aversion. I show that the agents with su¢ ciently low risk
aversion9 will always take those arbitrage opportunities; i.e., the incentive-compatibility
constraint can never be satised for them. Thus, there is no bank which targets those
low risk-aversion agents as depositors. In equilibrium, high risk-aversion agents are
depositors in banks and low risk-averse agents have to invest for themselves and obtain
their liquidity in the market.10
Equilibrium asset price volatility can be explained in many di¤erent ways. In this
paper, it is the uncertainty of the aggregate liquidity shock which causes the price
volatility.11 The relation between aggregate liquidity shock and the volatility of asset
with certainty. To achieve this, in the model I assume that the market opens after the withdrawal
decisions have been made. So depositors do not know which price is going to be realized when making
their withdrawal decisions.
9For the CRRA utility function, the agents with coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion smaller than 1.
10Those low-risk aversion agents may want to deposit in the bank which is designed for the high risk-
aversion depositors. To prevent such arbitrage activities, the bank will restrict the size of individual
deposit to the level of the endowment owned by the high risk-aversion agents. If the low risk-aversion
agents have much more endowments than that level, most of their endowments have to be invested by
themselves and get most of the their liquidity through the market. Even though the low risk-aversion
agents can deposit a small fraction of their endowment, it does not cause problem for the bank if the
population of the low risk-aversion agents is small relative to the high risk-aversion agents.
11Aggregate liquidity shock is not new in this literature. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there
is a section discussing why rst-best allocation cannot be achieved when there is aggregate liquidity
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prices has been analyzed by Allen and Gale (1994). The main issue in their paper
is how limited market participation can amplify the volatility of asset prices. In my
paper, I focus on how the aggregate liquidity shock can explain the coexistence of banks
and markets.12
There are several papers which also focus on the relation between banks and mar-
kets. Wallace (1988) argued that DD model can be interpreted as a model in which no
asset market exists because agents are physically separated. Diamond (1997) assumed
that participation in the asset market is limited. He showed that bank is then useful
because it can provide insurance among the impatient agents and the patient agents
who cannot access the market. Increased participation in the market will cause the
banking sector to shrink. Allen and Gale (2004) analyzed the relation between banks
and inter-bank markets. Individual agents cannot trade in the inter-bank markets.
Hence, markets do not strengthen the incentive-compatibility constraints. Antinol
and Prasad (2008) assumed that the asset market is characterized by limited enforce-
ment of contracts. If borrowers default, only a fraction of their assets can be seized.
This reduces the fraction of assets that can be used as collateral and individuals hit
by the liquidity shock face borrowing constraints. Antinol and Prasad (2008) showed
that the bank can ameliorate these constraints by pooling the resources of depositors
to increase the liquidity beyond that provided by the asset market. Farhi, Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2009) showed that government regulation (They propose liquidity oor.)
imposed on intermediaries can improve the resource allocation and the rst-best can
be achieved even the market exists. But in that paper, they did not explain why agents
shock. But aggregate liquidity shock has never been used to study the relation between banking and
the nancial market.
12There are other di¤erences between Allen and Gale (1994) and my paper. For example, in Allen
and Gale (1994), there is a xed cost for agents to participate the market. If agents decide no to
participate the market they have to be in autarky and they cannot invest in the illiquid asset. There
is no participation cost of the market in my model. And the investment options are the same for each
individual no matter whether she participate the market.
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deposit in the intermediaries rather than make the investment by themselves. Peck and
Shell (2009) captured the role of banks in providing checking accounts and facilitating
transactions. In that paper, banks are not redundant because agents need checking
account services.
In the present paper, the essential role of the bank is not based on its checking
account service. Furthermore, there is no restriction on market participation and the
asset market is free from the enforcement problems leading to collateral contracts.
The coexistence of banks and markets comes from the market price volatility and
heterogeneity in agentsrisk aversion.
In section 1.2, I describe the setup of the model. In section 1.3, I analyze equilibrium
for the case in which agents can only trade in the asset market. This will serve as a
benchmark. Section 1.4 is on the coexistence of banks and markets. I will show how
banks improve the expected utility of the high risk aversion agents and why there is
no bank for the low risk-aversion agents and thus they have to use the market for
re-adjusting their portfolios. Section 1.5 is the conclusion.
1.2 The Model
There are three periods: 0, 1 and 2. In each period, there is one good which can be
used for either investment or consumption. There are two available assets. The rst
asset is liquid; it is the storage technology: every unit invested in period t (t = 0; 1)
returns one unit of the good in period t + 1: The other asset is illiquid but o¤ers a
higher return: every unit of investment in period 0 can generate nothing in period 1
but it generates R > 1 units of the good in period 2: Table 1.1 describes the returns
of the two assets.
11
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Liquid Asset  1 1
 1 1
Illiquid Asset  1 0 R
Table 1.1: Asset Return
There is a continuum of agents. They can be divided into two groups. We label them
as group D and group M . It is useful later to think of group D as potential depositors
and group M as the potential market participants. (In the next section, when we
introduce the banking industry, we will show that group D will be the depositors and
group M will be the market participants.) The measure of the groups is 1 and m
respectively. The endowments at period 0 of each individual in the two groups are 1
and e respectively. There are no new endowments in later periods.
Both groups of agents have the DD preferences: In period 0, agents of a given
group are identical. In period 1, they receive a liquidity shock which turns some
of them into patient consumers and the rest into impatient consumers. A patient
consumer values only period-2 consumption and an impatient consumer values only
period-1 consumption. The liquidity shock to group-D agents is purely idiosyncratic:
The fraction of group-D agents who turn to be impatient in period 1 is D and D is a
constant. group-M agents,however, face aggregate liquidity shocks: The fraction of the
group-M agents becoming impatient in period 1 can be either H or L, where H >
L. The probabilities of having high aggregate liquidity demand H and low aggregate
liquidity demand L are q and (1  q) respectively. The aggregate liquidity shock will
be shown to make the equilibrium asset price volatile. Jacklins critique is based on
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the polar version of this model in which H = L or me = 0; that is, if either there is
no aggregate liquidity shock for the M agents or the endowment adjusted measure of
M agents is zero.
If an agent from group-i consumes the consumption in the period of her liquidity
need, her utility is given by the standard CRRA utility function:
Ui(C) = (C
1 i   1)=(1  i)
where i > 0 for i = D;M: group-D agents are more risk averse than the group-M
agents:
M < 1 < D:
The degree of risk aversion determines whether or not there is going to a bank that
targets that group for its depositors. We will show in section 1.4 that since M < 1, a
bank can never make the agents with di¤erent liquidity needs in that group self-select
given the arbitrage opportunities in the market. Group-M agents might deposit at
the bank designed for the D group if there is arbitrage opportunity in doing so. But
the deposit contract for group-D agents will take this into account and prevent such
arbitrage activities. In equilibrium, most or all of the endowments of the M group has
to be invested by themselves and they obtain the liquidity from the market.
An agentsgroup (D or M) and consumption type (patient or impatient) are her
private information. Aggregate liquidity demand is revealed to agents only through
observing asset prices.
In the next section, we will analyze the equilibrium when there is an asset market
in period 1 in which agents can trade the illiquid asset after they learn their liquidity
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need and in which there is no bank.
1.3 Asset Market Equilibrium
The asset market is the place where agents trade the illiquid asset for the consumption
good (the return from the liquid asset). For this section, we assume that there is no
bank. The sequence of the events is listed in the timeline in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Timeline 1
Each agent decides how to allocate her endowment at the beginning of period 0
given her expectation of the asset price of the illiquid asset in terms of consumption.
In equilibrium, expectation must be correct. Let pS be the price in period 1 of the
illiquid asset when the aggregate liquidity shock to the M agents is S (S = H; L).
The state S is not revealed directly. Agents learn S from the asset price. At any
positive price, the impatient agents would like to sell all of their illiquid asset. For the
patient agents, if pS > R; they also want to sell the illiquid asset. If pS = R; they are
indi¤erent between selling and buying illiquid asset. If pS < R, they strictly prefer to
buy the illiquid asset with the proceeds from their liquid asset.
In the equilibrium, we must have pS  R: If pS > R; no one wants to buy the illiquid
asset in state S and the market would be in equilibrium only if all of the endowment
was invested in the liquid asset. But this means that the asset price will be larger
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than R in each state. Then agents would invest only in the illiquid asset; which is a
contradiction. Thus in equilibrium we must have pS  R:
Equilibrium in the asset market is characterized by the following three conditions:
Condition (1) : Given asset prices in the di¤erent states, a group-D agent will
choose to invest the fraction lD of her endowment in the liquid asset to maximize her
expected utility. That is, she chooses lD 2 [0; 1] to maximize
qfUD[lD + (1  lD)pH ] + (1  )UD[lDR=pH + (1  lD)R]g
+(1  q)fUD[lD + (1  lD)pL] + (1  )UD[lDR=pL + (1  lD)R]g:
Condition (2) : Given asset prices in the di¤erent states, a group-M agent will
choose to invest the fraction lM of her endowment in the liquid asset to maximize her
expected utility. That is, she chooses lM 2 [0; 1] to maximize
qfHUM [(lM + (1  lM)pH)e] + (1  H)UM [(lMR=pH + (1  lM)R)e]g
+(1  q)fLUM [(lM + (1  lM)pL)e] + (1  L)UM [(lMR=pL + (1  lM)R)e]g:
Condition (3) : The asset market clears in each state:
pS = minfR; (1  D)lD +m(1  S)lMe
D(1  lD) +mS(1  lM)eg
for S = H;L:
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Denition 1.1 An asset market equilibrium consists of {lD; lM ; pH ; pL} satisfying con-
ditions (1), (2) and (3).
The existence of the asset market equilibrium can be established with a standard
xed-point argument. The details are given in the appendix.
Proposition 1.1 There exists an asset market equilibrium of this model.
One property of the equilibrium is pH < 1 < pL.13 It means when the aggregate
liquidity need is high, the illiquid asset can only be sold at a loss. This leads to volatile
consumption. Let CjPS and C
j
IS be the consumption of a patient agent (subscript P
) and an impatient agent (subscript I) of group j (j = D;M) when the aggregate
liquidity need of the M agents is S. We have C
j
IH < C
j
IL  CjPL < CjPH : ( CjIL = CjPL
if and only if pL = R ). So the expected utility of agents can be increased if one can
provide a smootherconsumption bundle. This makes the bank useful. The numerical
example below illustrates the market equilibrium.
13It can be seen by the following argument. By Condition (3), we have pH  pL. If pL  1 , then
1  pH  pL. Condition (1) and (2) imply lD = lM = 0: No liquid asset investment and Condition
(3) then imply that pH = pL = 0. A contradiction. Hence we have pH < 1: Now we can prove that
pL > 1. If otherwise, then Condition (1) and (2) imply lD = lM = 1: No illiquid asset investment and
Condition (3) imply that pH = pL = R. A contradiction. Hence, we must have pH < 1 < pL:
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Example 1.1
Parameters group-D agents group-M agents
fraction who are impatient D = 0:4
8><>: H = 0:45 w:p: q = 0:5L = 0:35 w:p: 1  q = 0:5
coe¢ cient of risk aversion D = 3 M = 0:5
measure 1 m = 1
endowment 1 e = 1
asset return R = 1:2
The equilibrium is characterized by : (fraction of group-D agentsendowment invested
in the liquid asset) lD = 0:4604; (fraction of group-M agentsendowment invested in the
liquid asset) lM = 0:3393; (price of the illiquid asset when H is realized) pH = 0:9019
and (price of the illiquid asset when L is realized) pL = 1:1111
In the above example, we can see that group-M agents invest less of their endow-
ment than the D agents do. This is because group-M agents are less risk averse.
The equilibrium consumptions of a group-D agent are: CDIH = 0:9471; C
D
PH = 1:260;
CDIL = 1:060 and C
D
PL = 1:145. The equilibrium consumptions of a group-M agent are:
CMIH = 0:9343; C
M
PH = 1:2430; C
M
IL = 1:0723 and C
M
PL = 1:1581.
1.4 The Bank And The Asset Market
Now we introduce a banking industry into the model. As other papers in the literature,
we assume that there is free entry in banking. Hence, a representative bank earns zero
prots and the equilibrium deposit contract is designed to maximize the depositors
welfares.
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The timeline will is described in Figure 1.2. (deposit contract announced and
withdrawal decisionsare new compared to Figure 1.1)
Figure 1.2: Timeline 2
Consider the case in which group-D agents have the opportunity to deposit in the
bank in period 0. To make it simple, we assume that group-D agents can choose to
deposit either 1 unit of the good or nothing. If an agent has deposited her entire
endowment, she can withdraw either D1 units of good in period 1 or D2 units of good
in period 2. The withdrawal decision has to be made before the asset market opens.
Since the aggregate liquidity shock is not observable at withdrawal, so D1 and D2
cannot depend on the aggregate liquidity need. The deposit contract (the values of D1
and D2) is announced by the bank at the beginning of period 0. The timeline (with
two events added) is shown in Figure 1.2. As in the original Diamond-Dybvig model,
the bank faces the resource constraint
DD1 + (1  D)D2=R = 1
The new, important feature here is that given the asset market, bank will face dif-
ferent incentive-compatibility constraints. Incentive-compatibility constraints are used
to allow depositors with di¤ering liquidity needs self-select correctly. If a depositor is
patient and demands withdrawal early, she gets D1. She can either store the proceeds
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and consume D1 in period 2 or go to the market, buy the illiquid asset and consume
the proceeds of the illiquid asset in period 2. Preventing the former deviation requires
the usual incentive constraint UD(D1)  UD(D2): To prevent the latter deviation, we
need
qUD(D1R=pH) + (1  q)UD(D1R=pL)  u(D2): (1)
Since both pH and pL are no larger than R, we know D1R=pH and D1R=pL are not
less than D1. So condition (1) implies that UD(D1)  UD(D2) holds.
For the impatient depositor, she can sell her right to withdraw D2 in exchange for
the period-1 good. Since the price of the illiquid asset is pS, the price of one unit of
period-2 good is pS=R. By selling D2 units of period-2 good, the impatient depositor
can get D2(pS=R) units of period-1 good. Her expected utility from this deviation
is qUD(D2pH=R) + (1   q)UD(D2pL=R): The incentive constraint which prevents this
deviation is
UD(D1)  qUD(D2pH=R) + (1  q)UD(D2pL=R): (2)
Since UD(D) = (C1 D   1)=(1  D); we have that (1) holds if and only if
D2
D1
 b(D; pH ; pL)R,
where b(D; pH ; pL) = 1=[q(pH)D 1+(1  q)(pL)D 1)]1=(D 1). Inequality (2) holds if
and only if
a(D; pH ; pL)R  D2
D1
,
where a(D; pH ; pL) = [q=(pH)D 1 + (1   q)=(pL)D 1]1=(D 1): It can be seen that
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a(D; pH ; pL) > b(D; pH ; pL) since D > 1. So we have the incentive constraints faced
by the bank are
a(D; pH ; pL)R  D2D1  b(D; pH ; pL)R (3)
Given the incentive constraints and the resource constraint, the bank will choose
(D1; D2) to maximize
DUD(D1) + (1  D)UD(D2);
such that DD1 + (1  D)D2=R = 1 and
a(D; pH ; pL)R  D2D1  b(D; pH ; pL)R:
Let W (pH ; pL) denote the maximum value14 of the expected utility.
Given the optimal contract (D1; D2), group-D agents will strictly prefer to deposit
in the bank if and only if (D1; D2) provides higher expected utility than the asset
market (meaning that the bank is not redundant). That is,
W (pH ; pL) > V (pH ; pL)
14Bank runs are ruled out since the illiquid asset cannot generate any return in the short run and
it will not be liquidated. Hence, the patient depositors can be guaranteed that they will get their
consumption in the nal period from the illiquid asset.
If we change the assumption on the asset returns so that the less liquid asset is not completely
illiquid then bank runs are possible. But the results of the model still hold as long as the probability
of bank runs is small. Peck and Shell (2003) study how bank runs can be tolerated when the run
probability is small.
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where V (pH ; pL) is the expected utility given the market price pH and pL. That is,
V (pH ; pL) = Max
0  lD  1
qfDUD[lD + (1  lD)pH ] + (1  D)UD[lDR=pH + (1  lD)R]g
+(1  q)fDUD[lD + (1  lD)pL] + (1  D)UD[lDR=pL + (1  lD)R]g
Banks targeting M agents as depositors will face the same incentive-compatibility
constraint as in (3). However, since group-M agents are less risk averse than the group-
D agents and their coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, M , is less than 1. Then we
have,
a(M ; pH ; pL) < b(M ; pH ; pL):
So the incentive-compatibility constraint cannot be satised and there is no banks
which targeting M agents as depositors.
Lemma 1.1 Banks targeting M agents as depositors are not available.
M agents may want to deposit in the bank for D agents. To prevent such arbitrage
activities, the D agentsbank will restrict the individual deposit size to 1 unit of goods.
If eachM agent has endowment e >> 1;most of their endowments cannot be deposited
in the bank. The total deposit from the M agents, which is equal to the measure of
that group, is m. It does not cause problem for the bank if m is su¢ ciently small
relative to measure of D agents, which is 1:
Lemma 1.2 If m is su¢ ciently smaller than 1 and e is su¢ ciently larger than 1; most
of the M agentsendowment cannot be deposited and they have to obtain liquidity from
the market. The bank for the D agents will not be a¤ected much.
21
Hence a group-M agent uses only the market and maximizes her expected utility
by choosing lM 2 [0; 1] to maximize15
qfHUM [(lM + (1  lM)pH)e] + (1  H)UM [(lMR=pH + (1  lM)R)e]g
+(1  q)fLUM [(lM + (1  lM)pL)e] + (1  L)UM [(lMR=pL + (1  lM)R)e]g:
The market-clearing condition must be satised. If the group-D agents decide to
deposit in the bank, only the group-M agents will trade on the asset market and hence
we have the market clearing condition:16
pS = minfR; (1  S)lM
S(1  lM)g
for S = H;L:
Denition 1.2 An equilibrium for the asset market and the bank in which the bank
is not redundant consists of {D1; D2; lM ; pH ; pL} which satises (1) (D1; D2) solves
the banks maximization problem, (2) W (pH ; pL) > V (pH ; pL), (3) lM solves group-M
agentsmaximization problem and (4) the asset market clears in each of the two states.
That conditions (3) and (4) in Denition 1.2 are satised can be established by a
standard x-point argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.1. Hence, the equilibrium
exists if and only if W (pH ; pL) > V (pH ; pL). The price volatility in the market makes
the participation in the market too risky for a group-D agent. If she needs liquidity in
15The value of lM is independent of the endowment because of the CRRA utility function. Hence,
whether or not the M agents deposit 1 unit of resource in the bank will not change their choice of lM :
16Since only the M agents use the market to get the liquidity, the size of the group M agents (m)
and their endowment (e) cancel. Only lm a¤ects the market clearing price.
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period 1 (being impatient) and the aggregate liquidity shock is high (H is realized),
she has to sell her illiquid asset at a low price pH . This will make her consumption
lower than that of the patient agents. Although when the aggregate liquidity need is
low the gap is smaller, a su¢ ciently risk averse group-D agent would like to make the
worst scenario (being impatient in a high aggregate liquidity need market) less bad.
By depositing in the bank, a group-D agent is protected from price volatility. So we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2 If the group-D agents are su¢ ciently risk-averse, then there is an
equilibrium in which both the asset market and the bank are active and in which neither
is redundant.
Proof. As we have seen, it is su¢ cient to prove that we have W (pH ; pL) > V (pH ; pL).
Let us rst look at V (pH ; pL) which is dened by:
V = Max
0  lD  1
qfDUD[lD + (1  lD)pH ] + (1  D)UD[lDR=pH + (1  lD)R]g
+(1  q)fDUD[lD + (1  lD)pL] + (1  D)UD[lDR=pL + (1  lD)R]g:
This is a standard maximization problem. Given the utility function UD(C) = (C1 D 
1)=(1  D), the rst-order interior condition becomes:
q(1  pH)f D
(lD + (1  lD)pH)D +
(1  D)R=pH
[lDR=pH + (1  lD)R]D g
+(1  q)(1  pL)f D
(lD + (1  lD)pL)D +
(1  D)R=pL
[lDR=pL + (1  lD)R]D g = 0:
Since pH < 1, (lD +(1  lD )pH)D ! 0 as D !1: So the left-hand side of the above
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equation must be positive for 0  lD  1. So the corner solution lD = 1 is optimal. A
su¢ ciently risk averse group-D agent would invests all of her endowment in the liquid
asset to protect herself against the worst scenario i.e., being impatient when aggregate
liquidity shock is high. So we have
V (pH ; pL) = DUD(1) + (1  D)[qUD(R=pH) + (1  q)U(R=pL)]:
To nd W (pH ; pL); solve the banks problem. As D !1, a(D; pH ; pL)! 1=pH
and b(D; pH ; pL) ! 1=pL. So the incentive constraints become R=pH  D2=D1 
R=pL. It is easy to see that as D ! 1, the lower bound of the incentive constraint
must bind and the optimal solution satises
DD1 + (1  D)D2=R = 1
and
D2 = D1R=pL:
Since (1; R) satises both the resource constraint and the incentive-compatibility
constraint, we have
W (pH ; pL) > DUD(1) + (1  D)UD(R): (4)
Also, for su¢ ciently large D, we must have UD(1)(R) > qUD(1)(R=pH) + (1  
q)UD(1)(R=pL). This is because given theCRRA utility function, UD(1)(R) > qUD(1)(R=pH)+
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(1   q)UD(1)(R=pL) is true if and only if 1 < q(pH)D 1 + (1   q)(pL)D 1: Since
pL > 1, the last inequality must hold for su¢ ciently large D: Given UD(R) >
qUD(R=pH) + (1  q)UD(R=pL), we have
DUD(1) + (1  D)UD(R)
> DUD(1) + (1  D)[qUD(R=pH) + (1  q)UD(R=pL)]
= V (pH ; pL):
(5)
(4) and (5) imply that when D is su¢ ciently large, we have
W (pH ; pL) > V (pH ; pL).
So there is an equilibrium in which both the asset market and the bank are active and
in which neither is redundant. This assumes that the group-D agent is su¢ ciently
risk-averse.
In Example 1.2, I use the same parameters as Example 1.1 except that m = 0:001
and e = 1000: These two changes are made to decrease the e¤ect of the deposits from
M agents in the D agentsbank.17 Since m e = 1 which is the same as Example 1.1,
the pure market equilibrium will be the same as Example 1.1.18
Example 1.2 Using the same parameters as in Example 1.1, we have D1 = 1:0189,
D2 = 1:1849, lM = 0:4056, pH = 0:8302, pL = 1:2. W = 0:0938 > V = 0:0884.
17In this example, M agents strictly prefer to deposit in D agentsbank and withdraw in period 1
no matter what their liquidity needs are. The D agentsbank will not be a¤ected much if it restricts
the size of the deposit to 1.
18Of course the equilibrium individual consumption of the M agents will be 1000 times the value of
the individual consumption in Example 1.1 because of the increased endowment for each individual.
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By depositing in the bank, a group-D agent will receive higher expected utility than by
participating in the market. The increase in a group-D agents welfare through the
bank (compared to the market) will be the equivalent of an increase in the endowment
of 0:66%:19 The bank will invest 0:4083 of the endowment in the liquid asset. This is
much lower than the fraction of endowment invested in liquid asset by D agents in the
pure market result in Example 1.1 (lD = 0:4604). This is because now there is mutual
insurance among the depositors. Hence, there is no need to keep as much of the liquid
asset to prepare for the liquidity need. The asset price is more volatile compared to the
pure market equilibrium since the D agents are depositors who will not participate in
the market where they absorb some of the aggregate liquidity shock caused by the M
agents. M agents will invest lM = 0:4056 of their endowment in the liquid asset. This
is more than in the pure market equilibrium of Example 1.1 (lM = 0:3393) because of
great asset price volatility.
When there is no aggregate uncertainty in the market, that is, when H = L orm=
0, things are di¤erent. The price of the illiquid asset is stable. In equilibrium, we must
have pH = pL = 1: The incentive constraints (3) collapse to D2=D1 = R: Combined
with the resource constraint the bank faces, we have that D1 = 1 and D2 = R. Hence,
in this case the bank is redundant in equilibrium: W = V = DUD(1)+(1 D)UD(R).
Jacklins critique applies in this case.
Proposition 1.3 If liquidity shocks are purely idiosyncratic, the bank is redundant.
In the present model, uncertainty of aggregate liquidity shocks, which generates
asset-price volatility, is necessary for non-redundancy of the bank. It is easier to coax
19If there is no market, that is, if we go back to the original Diamond-Dybvig model, the increase in
a group-D agents welfare due to the bank (compared to autarky) will be the equivalent to an increase
of the endowment by 1:53%
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depositors to "tell the truth" because they do not like the uncertainty in the asset
market. The bank provides the depositors with some "insurance" against idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks of the depositors and against the volatility of asset prices. Although
this "insurance" cannot be at the same level as in the case of the original DD model
(where no stock market exists), it nonetheless increases welfare over that of the pure
asset-market allocation.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies a DD-type bank in an economy with a nancial asset market.
Previous studies have shown that the opportunity trade in the asset market strengthens
the incentive-compatibility constraint for the bank, making the bank redundant. Two
new factors are introduced in the present paper: (1) The aggregate liquidity shock is
assumed to be uncertain (hence the market price of the illiquid asset is uncertain).
(2) Agents di¤er in their risk-aversion. Since depositors do not know the asset price
when making withdrawals, the rst factor makes arbitrage opportunities in the market
risky. For su¢ ciently risk-averse agents, they will not arbitrage in the market ,and the
incentive-compatibility constraint leaves room for the bank to provide insurance. That
is, banks are not redundant. But for less risk-averse agents, they will still take the risk
arbitrage opportunity. Hence, there is no bank targeting them as the depositors. They
will make investments by themselves and obtain liquidity through the market. In this
economy, there is non-trivial coexistence of banks and markets.
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1.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1
For any (lD; lM) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], there exists a unique price function pS(lD; lM)
dened by the market clearing condition (Condition 3):
pS(lD; lM) = minfR; (1  D)lD +m(1  S)lM
D(1  lD) +mS(1  lM)g
for S = H;L:
Given the asset price, a group-D agent maximizes her expected utility by choosing
liquid asset investment (Condition 1). Since the expected utility function is continuous
and strictly concave, there is a unique solution. Let F (lD; lM) = maxbl2[0;1]EU(bl; pH(lD; lM); pL(lD; lM)).
By the Theorem of Maximum, F (lD; lM) is a contiguous function of (lD; lM):
Similarly, a group-M agent maximizes her expected utility by choosing liquid as-
set investment (Condition 2). We denote the solution as G(lD; lM). G(lD; lM) is a
contiguous function of (lD; lM):
It is easy to see that FGmaps [0; 1][0; 1] into itself and satises the conditions of
Kakunatis xed-point theorem. Hence, the xed point exits and it is the equilibrium.
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2 Chapter 2: Bailouts and Bank Runs
2.1 Introduction
Most countries, if not all, have su¤ered from bank runs. According to Laeven and
Valencia (2008), 124 episodes of systemic bank runs have occurred in 93 countries since
the late 1970s.20 Bank runs are not merely historical events nor are all bank runsruns
on depository institutions. The recent nancial crisis, which involved nancial rms
runningon other nancial rms by not renewing sale and repurchase agreements,21
is suggestive of a panic-based bank run. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker said, The psychological panic a classic run on banks gives rise to a problem
for the whole system.22 Understanding panic-based bank runs is important.23 When
a bank run occurs, government bailouts of banks (among other types of government
interventions24) often follow. In some cases, including the recent nancial meltdown,
the magnitude of the government bailout is substantial. But bailouts are controversial.
A systematic framework to analyze the relationship between runs and bailouts is called
for.
In thinking about bailouts, two questions need to be addressed. First, why would
the government want to intervene and bail out banks ex-post, i.e. after a run? In other
words, what is the crisis-management role25 of bailouts? Second, how does the bailout
20For other empirical studies, see e.g. Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005), Demirguc-
Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000), Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) and Martinez-Peria and
Schmukler (2001).
21Gorton (2009). Gorton (2009) showed that: (1) The recent nancial crisis is a bank run in the
shadow banking system. (2) The shadow banking system, including the combination of repo and
securitized debt, is a kind of bank. (3) The runs on the shadow banking system had common features
with the classical runs on commercial banks.
22Scott, Kenneth, George P. Shultz and John B. Taylor eds. (2010).
23Gorton (2009) pointed out how important it is to understand classic panic-based bank runs for
understanding the recent crisis and for thinking about future nancial regulation policy.
24Laeven and Valencia (2008) collected data on crisis containment and resolution policies using a
variety of sources in the 42 systemic banking crises episodes (in 37 countries) that are well documented.
25Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)
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policy change the ex-ante probability of runs? That is, what is the crisis-prevention
role of bailouts?
In this paper, I answer these two questions by using a modied DD model.26 I
show that these two roles of government bailouts are in conict with each other. In my
model, a benevolent government has an incentive to bail out banks when a run occurs
since runs cause a misallocation of resources in the banking sector: Some depositors lose
their deposits in a run since the banks assets are exhausted during the run. Bailouts,
which transfer some resources from the government to the banking sector, can alleviate
that misallocation by enabling more depositors to withdraw.
However, anticipated bailouts increase the ex-ante probability of runs through two
channels. The rst channel is that the bailouts distort the ex-ante incentives of banks,
increasing the riskiness of their banking contracts. Anticipating government bailouts,
banks promise a higher short-term deposit interest rate in order to attract depositors.
The higher short-term deposit interest rate makes the banking sector more fragile and
increases the probability of a run. Regulation of the deposit-rate eliminates this dis-
tortion. The second channel is that the anticipated bailout increases the depositors
probability of getting her money from the bank when she participates in the run.27
With the additional resources from the bailout, banks are provided with extra with-
drawal capacity during a run. Hence, if a depositor expects that a bank run will occur,
26Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (also Bryant (1980)) modeled the essential function of banks as
providing maturity transformation. The maturity transformation can improve the ex-ante welfares of
the agents subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. They also show that bank runs, in which some
agents mispresent their liquidity needs and withdraw early, may occur as a result of panic. That
is, those agents who dont need liquidity may decide to withdraw early if they expect that a large
number of depositors will do so. As a result, the bank cannot satisfy all the withdrawal demand and
indeed fails.
27In the model, the government does not have enough resources to bailout the whole banking sector
and satisfy all the withdrawal demand if a system-wide bank run occurs. The reason for this is that
holding so much resources will distort the resources allocation in normal times and we assume the
cost of that ine¢ ciency outweighs the benet of completely ruling out bank runs.
This assumption is realistic given the size of the banking sector in our economy. In early 2007, total
assets of the entire banking system of the United States were about $10 trillion (Geithner, 2008).
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the anticipated bailout increases the probability of the depositor getting her money
from the bank if she participates in the run. When a depositor compares her expected
utility between withdrawing early or waiting to withdraw, because of the bailout her in-
centive to withdraw early is increased and the ex-ante probability of a run is increased.
Knowing the conicts between alleviating bank runs and preventing bank runs, the
government will announce, ex ante, a bailout policy that balances these two e¤ects. At
rst, I assume that the government can commit to this bailout policy. In Section 2.5,
I analyze the case of no-commitment and I show how the distortion of resources due
to bailouts is exacerbated with lack of commitment.
In a seminal paper, Keister (2010) introduced public good consumption (funded
by lump-sum tax revenue) into the DD model, providing a convenient way to model
the social cost of government bailouts. Bailouts are transfers from the government28
to the banking sector in the event of a bank run. Both bailouts and the public good
provision are funded by taxes collected ex-ante. Hence, bailouts crowd out the public
good provision.
My main innovation is to make the run probability endogenous. To do this, I
use a similar setup to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), who applied the global-games
approach29 to DD bank-run model.
The misalignment of objectives of the social planner and the banks is the key to
explaining the distortion of resources due to bailouts.30 The governments objective
is to maximize social welfare: An individual agents welfare depends on her private
28This view (bailouts are transfers from the government, made to rms or banks) was also raised
by Green (2010).
29Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998) showed that the introduction of
noisy signals to multiple-equilibria games may lead to a unique equilibrium. Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005) rst used the global-games approach to study the Diamond-Dybvig-type banks. They focus
on how the probability of bank runs are determined as a function of short-run deposit rate. They do
not discuss government policies which are the focus of this paper.
30In the original DD model, there is no public good consumption and the banks objective is the
same as a social planner.
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good consumption and its timing and on the level of the public good. Since each
agent consumes the same amount of the public good, an individual agents objective is
to maximize her welfare from the private good consumption given the level of public
good provision. In the free-entry banking sector,31 banks compete for depositors and
make zero prots in equilibrium. Hence, the deposit contract o¤ered by the represen-
tative bank is the same as the one that maximizes the depositors objectives.32 That
is, the deposit contract maximizes the depositors welfare solely from private good
consumption. The representative bank, acting rationally and independently, does not
internalize the scal cost of bailouts to the aggregate economy, which is reduced public
good provision. Hence, bank runs are less costly to the bank than to society (or
the benevolent government). The deposit contract o¤ered by banks provides greater
maturity transformation (i.e., a higher short-term deposit rate of interest) than the
socially optimal level. If the run probability is an increasing function of the short-term
deposit rate, this distortion results in an increased probability of bank runs.
To solve for the relationship between the short-term deposit rate and the prob-
ability of a bank run, I make the major innovation in the model. I show that the
probability of a bank run is endogenous, and is a function of the government bailout
policy and the short-term deposit rate promised by the representative bank. I use a
similar setup to that of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), who applied the global-games
approach to endogenize the ex-ante bank-run probability:33 The fundamentals of the
economy are stochastic. Agents do not have common knowledge of the realization of
the fundamentals, but rather obtain slightly noisy private signals. There is a unique
31The free-entry assumption is standard in the DD literature.
32In the DD literature which assumes free-entry competitive banking sector, the deposit contract
o¤ered by the bank is the same as the one that will maximize the depositors objective. Hence, without
the wedge between the objectives of a representative agent and the government, the deposit contract
o¤ered by a representative bank is socially optimal.
33Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) did not analyze government policy.
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Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which a bank run occurs if and only if the realized state
of the fundamentals is below a critical value. The critical value, which determines
the probability of a bank run, is a function of the government bailout policy and the
short-term deposit interest rate. I show, in this paper, that the run probability is an in-
creasing function of the bailout level and short-deposit rate. It needs to be emphasized
that runs in this model are largely panic based.34 In most scenarios, agents run on the
banks because they fear that others will do so. The realization of the fundamentals de-
termines whether or not a run occurs through changing agentsexpectations. Without
the change in agentsexpectations, the fundamentals themselves can only make bank
runs occur when the realization is extremely bad, which I assume occurs with only low
probability.
There are several papers which analyzed government bailouts and bank runs. Keis-
ter (2010) introduced the public good into DD model and showed that government
bailouts can increase the nancial system fragility. My paper is di¤erent from Keis-
ter (2010) in the three aspects: Firstly, the probability of bank runs is exogenous in
Keister (2010).35 Increased nancial system fragilitymeans for Keister that the set
of parameters which tolerates the bank runs is larger. In my paper, the probability is
34Both the panic-based bank runs and the recent nancial meltdown have their roots in
expectations depositors or lenders are afraid that banks or other counter-parties cannot honor their
obligations.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke expressed the same view in his testimony (September 2,
2010) to the Congress by saying that Lenders in the commercial paper market and other short-term
money markets, like depositors in a bank, place the highest value on safety and liquidity. Should
the safety of their investments come into question, it is easier and safer to withdraw fundsrun on
the bankthan to invest time and resources to evaluate in detail whether their investment is, in fact,
safe.
35In Keister (2010), bank runs are driven by a sunspot variable. Peck and Shell (2003) rst used
this method and showed that if the probability is below a certain range, the optimal deposit contract
will tolerate bank runs. Zhang (2011) analyzed the two-consumer example in Peck and Shell (2003)
with di¤erent parameter values. Zhang (2011) found that for some range of the parameters the run
probability determines not only whether the bank runs should be tolerated but also how bank runs
should be toleratedThe deposit rate is a strictly decreasing function of the bank run probability up
to a critical probability and above that critical probability the optimal deposit contract is run-proof.
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endogenous. Hence, I can analyze how the run probability changes with the bailout
policy. Secondly, Keister (2010) assumes that once the bank run occurs, the deposit
contract is re-scheduled. In my paper, as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), the deposit
contract is not re-scheduled. The bank will keep paying the promised payment to the
depositors until it runs out of resources. Thirdly, in my paper, the wedge(between
the banks objective and the governments objective) is di¤erent from the wedge in
Keister (2010). In my paper, the wedge is solely the public good consumption. The
wedge causes distortion because: (1) the bank does not see the decreased public
good consumption during bank runs. (2) the run probability increases as the bank
increases the short-term deposit interest rate. Hence, the expected costof increasing
the deposit interest rate is lower for the bank than the for the planner. In Keister
(2010), the wedge includes two parts: the public good consumption in a run, and
the private good consumption when the government starts the bailout. The latter
part is necessary for the wedge to cause distortion in Keister (2010). This is because
the run probability is assumed to be exogenous by Keister and the run probability
is independent of the short-term deposit interest rate. Hence, if the wedge is merely
the public good consumption (as in my paper), the expected costof increasing the
deposit interest rate is the same for the bank as for the planner. If, as in my paper,
the only thing the representative bank cannot seeis its e¤ect on public goods, then
in the Keister set-up in which the probability of run is exogenous, the banks choice of
deposit interest rate would be the same as if it were chosen by the planner.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), Chari and Kehoe (2010), Farhi and Tirole (2009)
analyzed government bailouts and banking crises without modelling the behavior of
depositors and they focus on moral hazard caused by bailouts.
The next section introduces the formal model. I will describe the agentsprefer-
ences, asset returns, information structure, and the timing. The model is analyzed in
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two parts: the post-deposit gameamong the depositors (Section 2.3) and the pre-
deposit game(Section 2.4) between the government and the bank. In the post-deposit
game I analyze the depositors withdrawal decision in period 1; while the depositors
take the government policy and the deposit contract as given. in the pre-deposit game
I analyze the governments and the banks choices in period 0; when they anticipate
the e¤ects of their choices on the depositors in the post-deposit game. In section 2.5,
I analyze the case in which the government is unable to make a commit to a bailout
policy. Section 2.6 is the summary.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 AgentsPreferences
There are three periods, t = 0; 1 and 2. And there is a continuum of agents with
measure 1 and indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. The preferences of the agents are the same as
Keister (2010): The agents consume both the private good and the public good. The
public good is consumed in period 1: For the private good consumption, there is an
idiosyncratic preference shock36 to each agent in period 1 : the ex-ante identical agents
become either patient or impatient. An impatient agent values only the private good
in period 1. A patient agent values the private good in both period 1 and period 2; and
they are perfect substitutes. If we denote ct as the consumption of the private good in
period t and g as the consumption of the public good in period 1, the utility function
of an impatient agent is
u(c1) + v(g) (6)
36The preference shock can also be interpreted as a liquidity shock. The impatient agents need
liquidity to consume.
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The utility function of a patient agent is
u(c1 + c2) + v(g) (7)
u and v are continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
 cu00(c)=u0(c) > 1;
for c > 0. That is, for the private good consumption, the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion is larger than 1:37 We normalize u(0) to be 0.38
With probability  the agent becomes impatient and with probability (1   ) she
becomes patient. Agents types are i.i.d. Hence, the proportion of impatient and
patient agents in period 1 are  and (1  ) respectively.
2.2.2 Endowments and Asset Returns
Each agent is endowed with one unit of resources in period 0: There are no endowments
in later periods. The endowments in period 0 can be invested in an asset. The return
of the investment39 depends on ; which is the state of fundamentals and is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0; 1]. Higher realizations of  corresponds to stronger
fundamentals.
For  2 [0; ], if the asset is liquidated in period 1, one unit of the asset yields one
37As Diamond-Dybvig, this assumption makes the maturity transformation desirable.
38This normalization is just for simplication of the algebra. All the results still hold as long as
u(0) >  1: If u(0) =  1, then bank runs are devastating and banks will not provide any maturity
transformation.
39The assumption of the asset return is the same as Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
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unit of output. If the asset is liquidated in period 2, one unit of the asset can generate R
units of output with probability p(), or 0 units with probability 1  p(): R is strictly
larger than 1 and p() is strictly increasing in : We assume E[p()]u(R) > u(1).
This implies that for patient agents the expected long-term return is superior to the
short-term return.
For  2 [; 1]; we will have a state at which the economic fundamentals are extremely
strong. Extremely strong fundamentals make the the high return R on the long-term
asset to be certain: p() = 1 for  2 [; 1]: Since this is just an extreme case, we assume
that  ! 1. The short-term asset return also improves because of the extremely strong
fundamentals: if liquidated in period 1, one unit of asset can also yield R units of
output. We will see in the next section that in the range of states at which fundamentals
are extremely strong, a patient agent withdraws late no matter what others do. Hence,
there are no panic runs. The assumption40 that this range of strong fundamentals exists
reects the intuition that su¢ ciently strong fundamentals can prevent the depositors
from panicking.41
Both the private good and public good can be produced directly from the proceeds
of the asset. One unit of the proceeds can produce one unit of public good or one unit
of private good.
2.2.3 AgentsInformation
In period 0, agents are identical. Each agent i knows that she will become impatient
with probability  and patient with probability (1   ) in period 1. She also knows
40This assumption is also used by other models which apply the global-games method. Morris and
Shin (1998), the authors assume that when the fundamentals are extremely strong, the speculators
prots from attacking the currency are outweighed by the transaction cost of doing so. Hence, there
is no currency attack when the fundamentals are extremely strong.
41Some empirical studies, like Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), show that the probability of
a banking crisis is decreasing when the macroeconomic performance is strong.
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that the state of fundamentals, , is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1].
In period 1, each agent i knows her own type (patient or impatient), which is her
private information. The state of the fundamentals  is determined at the beginning
of period 1, but the realization is not revealed. Agent i gets a private noisy signal i
concerning the sate of the fundamentals.
i =  + "i;
where the noise "i is i:i:d uniformly distributed over [ "; "]: The scalar " is assumed to
be small. Agent i uses her signal to update her belief about : Conditional on i; the
posterior distribution of  for agent i is a uniform distribution on the interval:
[maxf0; i   "g;minf1; i + "g]:
2.2.4 Banks
Agents su¤er from preferences shocks. Banks can improve the agentswelfares by o¤er-
ing a demand-deposit contract, which works as an insuranceagainst these shocks. I
assume banks o¤er a DD-like deposit contract: An agent deposits her after-tax endow-
ment (1  ) in period 0 (the tax will be discussed later). If she demands to withdraw
in period 1, she gets a xed payment c1 until the bank runs out of resources. (The
bank serves the depositors sequentially42 and the position of the depositor in the queue
is random.) If she waits until period 2, she shares the remaining resources in the bank
42The sequential service constraint (Wallace 1988) implies that the bank cant observe how many
agents would like to withdraw in period 1. The bank keeps satisfying the withdrawal demand until it
runs out of resources.
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with the other depositors who have not withdrawn in period 1. Hence, the deposit
contract can be characterized by the short-term payment c1.
As in the DD literature, the banking industry is subject to free-entry. Banks com-
pete for depositors and make zero prots in equilibrium. Hence, the deposit contract
o¤ered by a bank is the same as the one that maximizes an individual depositors
objectives.
Banks cannot observe agents types (patient or impatient) nor receive up-dated
information on the fundamentals.
2.2.5 Government
The (benevolent) government provides the public good and maximizes the agents
welfares. To nance the public good provision (in period 1), the government imposes
a lump-sum tax  on each agents endowment in period 0.43 We use g to denote the
level of public good provision.
If a bank run occurs in period 1 and the withdrawals have exhausted the banks
assets, the government can transfer some of the tax revenue to the banks, allowing the
banks to satisfy more withdrawal demand. These transfers are the bailouts.44 The
governments bailout policy is characterized by the maximum transfers it can make,
b. The government will announce b in period 0: We assume that the government can
commit to b. (We will discuss the case of no commitment in Section 2.5).
The actual level of bailouts, b, depends on the proportion of depositors who demand
early withdrawal. Let us use n to denote the proportion of depositors who want to
withdraw in period 1. If the total withdrawal demand, nc1; is lower than the banks
43Since agents start to consume at the beginning of period 1; the government cannot collect more
tax in period 1:
44One thing needs to be emphasized is that the government bailout is not a guarantee of deposit
return.
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total available resource (1   ); then the bank can stand alone and no bailouts will
be granted. If nc1 > (1   ); government bailouts will cover the withdrawal demand
beyond (1  ) until the bailouts reach the maximum level b. To summarize, we have:
b =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if nc1  (1  )
nc1   (1  ) if (1  ) < nc1  b+ (1  )
b if b+ (1  ) < nc1
The budget of the government must be balanced.45 Hence, the tax revenue of the
government equals the sum of the expenditures on bailouts and public goods:
 = b+ g:
The government does not observe agentstypes (patient or impatient) nor receive up-
dated information on the fundamentals.
2.2.6 Timeline
In period 0 of the pre-deposit game:
Figure 2.1: Pre-deposit Game
45This is a very simple case of Ricardian equivalence.
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(1) The government collects the lump-sum tax  and announces the bailout limit
b. Banks announce the short-term payment c1. The government and the bank move
simultaneously.
(2) Agents make their deposit decisions. In equilibrium, agents will deposit their
after-tax endowment (1  ) in the banks.
In period 1 of the post-deposit game:
Figure 2.2: Post-deposit Game
(1) Depositor i learns her type and receives her signal i.
(2) Depositor i makes her withdrawal decision according to her type and her signal
i. If she attempts to withdraw, she gets a random position in the queue of depositors
who seek to withdraw.
(3) The government provides public goods at the level g. If a bank run occurs and
banks runs out of resources, the government will provide bailouts at level b.
When the government and the bank make their choices in period 0, they consider
depositorsresponses in period 1. Hence, we need to analyze the model backward. In
the next section, I analyze the depositorswithdrawal decisions in period 1 taking  , b
and c1 as given.
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2.3 Post-Deposit Game: Depositors Withdrawal Decision in
Period 1
In period 1, after the depositors learn their types, the impatient depositors withdraw
since they value only the period-1 consumption. The only thing that needs to be
analyzed is the patient depositorswithdrawal decisions. Each patient depositor i can
choose an action ai between two possibilities: ai = 1 (withdraw), or ai = 0 (wait).
This is a game among the patient depositors (the post-deposit game) since individual
payo¤s also depend on otherschoices. Each patient depositor forms her expectation
about otherschoices from her private signal on the state of the fundamentals. The
strategy of a patient depositor is a function specifying her action for each possible
private signal i.
Denition 2.1 In the post deposit game of period 1, a strategy for a patient depositor
i is a function si : [0  "; 1 + "]! f0; 1g:
Throughout the paper, I focus on switching strategy46 and threshold equilib-
rium. A switching strategyis characterized by a cuto¤ point k such that a patient
depositor withdraws if and only if her private signal is below k :
si =
8>>>><>>>>:
1; if i < k
0; if i  k
Denition 2.2 A threshold equilibrium of the post deposit game, is a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in which each patient depositor i nds it optimal to use the switching strat-
egy with cuto¤ point k; given that all other patient depositors use the same strategy.
46Morris and Shin (2001)
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Suppose the realized state of the fundamentals is : The signals will be uniformly
distributed over [ "; +"]: Hence, if all patient depositors use the switching strategy
with cuto¤ point k; the proportion of patient depositors who withdraw equals 1 if
 < k  "; It equals [k  (  ")]=(2") if k  "    k+ "; It equals 0 if  > k+ ": Since
the impatient depositors always withdraw and the proportion of impatient depositors
is ; the total proportion of depositors who withdraw is:
n(; k) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1; if  < k   "
+ (1  )[1
2
+ k 
2"
]; if k   "    k + "
; if  > k + ":
(8)
When n(; k)c1  (1 ); the bank can satisfy all the withdrawal demand in period 1
by liquidating its own asset. No government bailouts are granted. If a patient depositor
i waits until period 2 to withdraw, she can share the proceeds from the remaining
asset with others who have not withdrawn. When the state of the fundamentals is
; the probabilities of high long-term asset return, R, and low asset return, 0, are
p() and 1   p() respectively. Hence, the patient depositors expected utility from
withdrawing in period 2 is
p()u(
1     nc1
1  n R) + [1  p()]u(0) = p()u(
1     nc1
1  n R):
If she withdraws in period 1, she can be served by the bank since the total period-1
withdrawal demand is smaller than the liquidation value of the banks asset, and her
expected utility is u(c1):We use (; k) to denote the di¤erence in the expected utility
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for a patient depositor between withdrawing in period 2 and withdrawing in period 1.
Hence, when n(; k)c1  (1  ),
(; k) = p()u(
1     nc1
1  n R)  u(c1):
When (1  ) < n(; k)c1  b+ (1  ); the liquidation value of the bank is smaller
than the total withdrawal demand in period 1. The bank has to liquidate all its asset
to satisfy the early withdrawal demand. If a patient depositor i waits until period
2 to withdraw, she cannot get anything. But with the additional resources from the
government bailout, all the period-1 withdrawal demand can be satised, and if the
patient depositor chooses to withdraw in period 1, her utility is u(c1): Hence, when
(1  ) < n(; k)c1  b+ (1  ),
(; k) =  u(c1):
When n(; k)c1 > b+ (1  ); the total period-1 withdrawal demand is larger than
the sum of maximum bailout level and the banks liquidation value. If the patient
depositor i withdraws in period 2, she still cannot get anything as the previous case. If
she withdraws in period 1; the probability of being served is b+(1 )
nc1
and the expected
utility is b+(1 )
nc1
u(c1): Hence, when n(; k)c1 > b+ (1  ),
(; k) =  b+ (1  )
nc1
u(c1):
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However, a patient depositor i cannot observe the realized state of the fundamentals
directly. She has to calculate the expectation of (; k) from the posterior distribution
over the states conditional on her signal i. Denoting that expectation by (i; k), we
have:
(i; k) =
1
2"
Z
i + "
i   "(; k)d
Lemma 2.1 states the continuity property of (i; k), which is useful in establishing
the existence of the threshold equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1 (i; k) is continuous in i and k:
Proof. It is easy to see that (; k) is bounded. Continuity of (i; k) with respect to
i holds because a change in i only shifts the limits of integration [i  "; i+ "] in the
computation of (i; k); and (; k) is bounded. Continuity of (i; k) with respect to
k holds since (i; k) is an integral over a segment of 
0s and (; k) is bounded.
Given the denition of the threshold equilibrium, we know that the switching strat-
egy with cuto¤point k is an equilibrium strategy if and only if the following two condi-
tions hold:47 (1) (i; k) < 0; for i < k and (2) (i; k)  0; for i  k:We prove the
existence and uniqueness of the threshold equilibrium by the following two steps: rst,
in Lemma 2.2, we prove there is a unique k such that if all others use k as a cuto¤
point, patient depositor i is indi¤erent between waiting and withdrawing if she gets a
signal equal to k. Then, in Lemma 2.3, we prove that depositor i strictly prefers to
withdraw if she gets a signal below k and strictly prefers to wait if she gets a signal
above k. The proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 2.2 There is a unique k such that (k; k) = 0
47We assume that a patient depositor does not withdraw if she is indi¤erent between the period-1
and period-2 withdrawals.
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Lemma 2.3 (i; k) < 0 for i < k and (i; k) > 0 for i > k
Proposition 2.1 follows directly from Lemma 2:2 and Lemma 2:3.
Proposition 2.1 In the post-deposit game, there is a unique threshold equilibrium in
which each patient depositor uses the switching strategy with the cuto¤ point k. k is
the unique solution which solves (k; k) = 0:
The uniqueness of the threshold equilibrium is central to the analysis of the impacts
of government policy and the deposit contract. We can see how the maximum bailout
level (b) and the short-term deposit rate of interest (c1=(1  )) a¤ect the value of k.
Since a bank run is dened as occurring when a positive measure of patient depositors
withdraw in period 1, it follows that k is the ex-ante probability of runs:48
Corollary 2.1 The ex-ante probability of runs k is non-decreasing in b: It is strictly
increasing in b if b < c1   (1  ).
The proof of Corollary 2.1 is in the appendix. The anticipated bailouts can change
the run probability by a¤ecting the depositorsincentives to run. If b + (1   ) < c1;
only a proportion of depositors can be served when the withdrawal demand nc1 is
larger than b + (1   ). Because of sequential service, the probability of being served
is b+(1 )
nc1
: A higher level of bailouts implies a higher probability of being served, which
makes withdrawing more attractive. Hence, a patient depositor is indi¤erent between
wait and withdraw ((k; k) = 0) only when she expects a stronger state of
fundamentals. That is why the cuto¤ point k is strictly higher. If b+(1  )  c1; all
the withdrawal demand can be satised even when everyone withdraws (n = 1). Hence,
48The patient depositor withdraws only when she receives a signal lower than k: The signal of a
depositor is uniformly distributed in the interval [  "; + "]: Hence, a bank run occurs if  < k+ ":
Since the prior distribution of the fundamental  is the uniform distribution over the interval [0; 1];
as " approaches 0 the probability of bank runs approaches k.
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a rst-order change in the bailout does not a¤ect the patient depositorsdecision and
hence does not a¤ect k.
Corollary 2.2 states the relationship between the run probability and the short-term
deposit rate of interest.
Corollary 2.2 The ex-ante probability of runs k is increasing in  and c1.
The proof can be found in the appendix. A higher short-term payment c1 makes
the bank more vulnerable to runs. The intuition is simple: If the period-1 payment
is increased, then the payment in period 2 is decreased and the incentive of patient
agents to withdraw in period 1 is higher. Furthermore, knowing that other patient
agents are more likely to withdraw in period 1, the agent assigns a higher probability
to the event of a bank run. This will increase the run probability further.
2.4 Pre-Deposit Game: Choices of the Government and the
Banks in Period 0
In Section 2.3, there are only partial-equilibrium results: depositorschoices were ana-
lyzed taking government policy and the deposit contract as given. This section shows
how the government policy and the deposit contract are determined in period 0, given
the depositorsresponses in the post-deposit game. In this pre-deposit game, the gov-
ernment chooses  and b, and the bank chooses c1 simultaneously. The equilibrium is
Nash. In this section, I assume that the government can commit to the bailout policy.
The no-commitment case is analyzed in the next section.
2.4.1 The Banks Strategy
Each depositor enjoys the same level of the public good g as the other depositors.
Given g, the depositor maximizes her welfare from private good consumption. In
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the free-entry banking sector, banks compete for depositors and make zero prots
in equilibrium. The deposit contract o¤ered by the bank maximizes the depositors
objective. That is, given  and b; the bank chooses c1 to maximize:49
R k(;b;c1)
0
minf1; 1 +b
c1
gu(c1)d
+
R 1
k(;b;c1)
[u(c1) + (1  )p()u( (1 ) c11  R)]d:
(9)
where k( ; b; c1) is the cuto¤point of the depositors switching strategy, which has been
analyzed in the previous section. The objective of the representative bank includes
two parts: The rst integral is the depositors expected utility from private good
consumption when there is a bank run. When a bank run occurs, the proportion of
depositors who can be served is minf1; 1 +b
c1
g: The second integral is the depositors
expected utility from private good consumption when there is no bank run.
If the bank chooses c1 which is larger than 1    + b; the following rst-order
condition must be satised (To simplify the notation, k is not written explicitly as a
function):
k 1 +b
c1
[u0(c1)  u(c1)=c1]
+(1  k)fu0(c1)  u0( (1 ) c11  R)RE[p() j > k ]g
= 0
(10)
The rst term is the misallocation e¤ect due to c1 when a bank run occurs: higher
c1 implies fewer depositors can be served and a larger consumption disparity between
49This expression is under the assumption that "! 0 and  ! 1.
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the depositors who are served and those who are not. The second term is the risk-
sharing e¤ect of c1 in normal times: higher c1 implies more insuranceprovided to
the depositors against the preference shocks. The bank balances these two e¤ects.
If the bank chooses c1 which is smaller than 1    + b; the following rst-order
condition must be satised:
ku0(c1)
+(1  k)fu0(c1)  u0( (1 ) c11  R)RE[p() j > k ]g
= 0
(11)
Now, even if a bank run occurs, all depositors can be served with the additional re-
sources from the bailout. The misallocation e¤ect of c1 no longer exists; on the contrary,
higher c1 can increase the expected utility when a bank run occurs since the depositors
can get more resources from the bailout. The risk-sharing e¤ect of c1 in normal time
remains the same. Hence, the bank chooses c1  1   + b only if the risk-sharing e¤ect
requires the bank to do so. Otherwise, increasing c1 always increases the depositors
expected utility.
The risk-sharing e¤ect of c1 depends on the risk aversion of the depositors, the
asset return and the size of the deposit (1  ): Dene bc1() as the optimal short-term
payment when the deposit is (1  ) and the bank run does not occur. That is,
bc1() = argmax
c1
u(c1) + (1  )E[p()]u((1  )  c1
1   R):
Lemma 2.4 bc1() is a decreasing function of  and there exists a unique b such that
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bc1(b) = 1:
Proof. bc1() is characterized by the rst-order condition:
u0(c1) = E[p()]u0(
(1  )  c1
1   R)R: (12)
Since  cu00(c)=u0(c) > 1 for c > 0, we have
1   < bc1() < (1  )R: (13)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
bc10() =  1=  E[p()]u00((1  )  bc1
1   R)R
2=[(1  )u00(bc1)] < 0: (14)
Hence, bc1() is an decreasing function of  . Since bc1(0) > 1 and bc1(1   1=R) < 1; we
know there exists a unique b such that bc1(b) = 1:
1   b is the value of deposits above which the risk-sharing e¤ect requires that the
short-term payment be strictly greater than 1. Let p(b) = u(1)=u( (1 b) 
1  R), where
b
is the state of the fundamentals below which the patient depositor always withdraws
in period 1, when the short-term payment is equal to 1. If the short-term payment
is less than 1, the run probability k is less than b. Proposition 2.2 says that if b is
su¢ ciently small (i.e., the expected return of the asset is su¢ ciently favorable) and
the deposit is su¢ ciently large (larger than 1  b), the bank provides liquidity via the
deposit contract and takes on the risk that in a bank run not all depositors who want
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to withdraw can do so.
Proposition 2.2 If b is su¢ ciently small and   b , the bank chooses a short-term
payment c1 which is strictly larger than the sum of the bailouts and the liquidation value
of the banks asset (1   + b): Hence, if a bank run occurs, some depositors cannot be
served even with the bailout.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The intuition for this proposition is the
following. When   b ; the risk-sharing e¤ect requires c1 to be larger than 1: Since the
bailout is restricted by the government budget, we have b   and 1   + b < 1: (11)
implies that if c1 < 1   + b, the expected utility of the depositors can be improved by
increasing c1: If c1 = 1   + b, the risk-sharing e¤ect still requires c1 to be increased.
But (10) shows that the bank also considers the misallocation e¤ect. However, b is
the upper bound of the run probability k. If b is su¢ ciently small, the misallocation
e¤ect is small and is dominated by the risk-sharing e¤ect. Hence, the bank chooses c1
which is larger than 1   + b.
A corollary of this theorem is that, agents always choose to deposit in period 0:
Corollary 2.3 If b is su¢ ciently small and   b , agents choose to deposit in period
0.
Proof. The bank can always mimic the autarky allocation by setting c1 = 1    :
Proposition 2.2 says that the bank will not choose the autarky allocation, which means
that the expected utility of an individual is higher by using the deposit contract than
autarky. An agent always chooses to deposit to get a higher expected utility from the
private good consumption than she would in autarky, taking the public good as given.
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2.4.2 The Governments Strategy
Now we can analyze the governments policy. As discussed before, the government
and the bank have di¤erent objectives. The governments objective is to maximize the
depositors expected utility not only from the private good consumption but also from
the level of the public good consumption. Given c1; the government chooses  and b
to maximize R k(;b;c1)
0
minf1; 1 +b
c1
gu(c1)d
+
R 1
k(;b;c1)
[u(c1) + (1  )p()u( (1 ) c11  R)]d
+
R k(;b;c1)
0
v(   b)d
+
R 1
k(;b;c1)
v()d:
(15)
The sum of the last two integrals is the wedge between the governments and the
banks objectives. The third integral is the utility from the public good consumption
when a bank run occurs. Some tax revenue is used to provide bailouts. Hence, the
public good provision is reduced to (   b): The last integral is for the case when there
is no bank run and hence all the tax revenue is used to nance the public good.
Since the government considers the allocation of the resources between the public
and private sectors, we focus on the case in which lim
!0
v0() = +1 and lim
!bv0() = 0.
Imposing a high level of taxation ( > b) is costly since it distorts the resources
allocation between the public and private sectors. Hence, the optimal tax chosen by
the government will be in the range (0;b). According to Proposition 2.2, in equilibrium
we must have c1 > 1   + b:
I will rst analyze the distortion of resources caused by the bailout: the bank takes
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on more risk than the socially optimal level. The socially optimal c1 is characterized
by the rst order condition of (15) with respect to c1:50
k 1 +b
c1
[u0(c1)  u(c1)=c1]
+(1  k)fu0(c1)  u0( (1 ) c11  R)RE[p() j > k ]g
 [v()  v(   b)] @k=@c1
= 0:
(16)
The rst and second terms are the misallocation e¤ect and risk-sharing e¤ect of c1;
which have been analyzed in (10). The third term is the bailout e¤ect of c1: higher c1
increases the expected cost of the bailout since higher c1 increases the run probability
k (Corollary 2.1). The expected cost of the bailout is measured by the run probability
multiplied by the loss of utility from the reduced level of the public good due to the
bailout. Since the bank does not consider the public good provision, the third e¤ect
does not appear in (10). The missing third term implies that the bank does not see
the complete social cost of a bank run, which also includes the cost of the bailout.
Therefore, the bank o¤ers a higher short-term payment c1 and takes on more risk than
is socially optimal.
Proposition 2.3 Given the bailouts, the bank o¤ers a higher short-term payment c1
and takes on more risk than the socially optimal level. This distortion increases the
ex-ante run probability.
If the government cannot directly implement the deposit-rate controls, its best
50Since lim
!bv0() = 0; we know that 1 +bc1 < 1 from Proposition 2.2.
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strategy on choosing  and b is characterized by the rst-order conditions for given c1:
The rst-order conditions of (15) with respect to b is:
k[u(c1)=c1   v0(   b)]
 @k=@b [v()  v(   b)]
= 0:
(17)
The rst term in (17) reects the net benet of the bailout when a bank run occurs:
providing one more unit of resource to the bank can make (1=c1) more depositors get
their money and crowd out 1 unit of the public good. This increases the expected utility
of a depositor by u(c1)=c1   v0(   b): The second term captures the destabilizing cost
of the bailout: a larger bailout increases the run probability through increasing the
depositors incentive to run in the post-deposit game. The optimal bailout balance
these two e¤ects.
The rst-order conditions of (15) with respect to  is:
k[v0(   b)  u(c1)=c1]
+(1  k)[v0()  u0( (1 ) c1
1  R)RE[p() j > k ]]
 @k=@  [v()  v(   b)]
= 0:
(18)
The rst term in (18) reects the fact that if the bank run occurs, a higher tax-rate
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gives the government more room to implement the bailout. The second term states
that the higher tax, in normal times, distorts the resource allocation between the public
good and private good. The last term states that higher tax increases the ex-ante run
probability, thus increasing the expected cost of the bailout.
Denition 2.3 An equilibrium of the pre-deposit game, is a Nash equilibrium in which
the bank chooses c1 by (10) and the government chooses  and b by (17) and (18).
Proposition 2.4 states that the equilibrium level of bailouts must be strictly positive.
Proposition 2.4 In equilibrium, the government chooses a strictly positive bailout
level.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition for this proposition is that when the
bailout level is low, the destabilizing e¤ect is negligible. Hence, the government chooses
zero bailout only if the utility loss due to the crowding out of the public good outweighs
the utility gain from allowing more depositors to consume the private good. That is,
u(c1)=c1 < v
0(): Since the private good consumption is valued even less in normal times
than the private good consumption when a bank run occurs, increasing  and providing
more of the public good can increase the depositors welfare in both the normal times
and when a bank occurs. Hence, in equilibrium we cannot have u(c1)=c1 < v0(), which
implies that b > 0 in equilibrium.
2.5 Bailouts without Government Commitment
The previous analysis assumes that the government can commit to b which is announced
ex-ante. A natural interpretation of that assumption is that b is established by legis-
lation or even a constitution. This section analyzes the case in which the government
cannot make a prior commitment to its future bailout decision.
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Without commitment, once the bank run occurs, the government will choose the
ex-post e¢ cient bailouts. If we use the superscript NC to denote the case of no
commitment, we have that the government will choose b
NC
to equate the marginal
utility from the public good with the marginal utility from private good consumption.
v0(   bNC) = 1
c1
u(c1): (19)
The reason is that once a bank run occurs, the government is no longer concerned with
its e¤ect on the run probability.51 Hence, the ex-post e¢ cient level of the bailout is set
to equalize the marginal utilities of the public good and the private good consumptions.
When the government cannot make a commitment to the bailout level, the structure
of the post-deposit game remains the same as the one which is analyzed in Section 2.3.
The reason is that when a depositor makes her withdrawal decision, she takes the level
of the bailout as given. It does not matter whether that given bailout level is the
ex-ante committed level or the ex-post e¢ cient level. Hence, in the post-deposit game
there is a unique threshold equilibrium. The next proposition is similar to Proposition
2.1.
Proposition 2.5 When the government cannot make a commitment to the bailout
level, there is a unique threshold equilibrium in the post-deposit game. In equilibrium,
each patient depositor uses a switching strategy with the cuto¤ point kNC. kNC is an
increasing function of  and c1:
In the pre-deposit game, the bank chooses c1 to maximize (9), the welfare from
private good consumption. Now the government has only one ex-ante choice variable,
51Since this is not a repeated game, the government does not take into account its reputation or
the impact of bailout on the future actions of the bank.
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 . The ex-post bailout is a function of  and c1 given by (19). The banks strategy is
given by:
kNC 1 +b
NC
c1
[u0(c1)  u(c1)=c1]
+(1  kNC)fu0(c1)  u0( (1 ) c11  R)RE[p()
 > kNC ]g
+kNC  (@bNC=@c1) u(c1)=c1
= 0;
(20)
where to simplify the notation, kNC and b
NC
are not written explicitly as functions.
The governments strategy is given by the rst-order condition:
(1  kNC)[v0()  u0( (1 ) c1
1  R)RE[p()
 > kNC ]]
 @kNC=@  [v()  v(   bNC)]
= 0:
(21)
Proposition 2.6 When the government cannot commit to a bailout policy, in the equi-
librium the depositors expected utility is lower than in the commitment case. The
ex-post bailout level and the run probability are higher than the commitment case.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition for this proposition is that when the
government cannot make a commitment, the bailout cannot be chosen by the govern-
ment ex ante. In period 0, there are many feasible bailout levels. The government
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that is able to commit, chooses the best of these b0s. Hence, welfare in the no com-
mitment case is lower than in the commitment case. For given  and c1; (17) implies
that the ex-post bailout level is larger than the ex-ante e¢ cient level. Hence, without
commitment, the government provides a bigger bailout. The anticipated larger bailout
increases the run probability both through changing the depositors incentives to run
in the post-deposit game and through increasing the deposit-rate of interest because
of the distortion of resources due to bailouts.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, I analyzed bailouts and bank runs in a modied DD model. Following
Keister (2010), my model includes both a private good and a public good. The major
innovation in this paper is to determine the run probability by using the global-games
approach in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), making the run probability endogenous.
I show that bailouts increase the ex-ante run probability through two channels. The
rst channel works through the misaligned objectives of the bank and the government:
Runs are less costly for banks when there are bailouts. Hence, banks take on more risk
than is socially optimal. Regulation of the short-term deposit-rate can eliminate this
distortion, but such regulation might not be so simple in shadow banking. At ant rate,
an analysis of the e¤ects of short rate regulation though very important is beyond the
scope of this paper. The second channel works through the change in the depositors
incentives to run: Bailouts increase the probability that a depositor will get her money
if she participates in a run, thus increasing the likelihood of a run.
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2.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. Let a(k) = (k; k): a(k) is the expected di¤erence in the utilities of a patient
depositor i between withdrawing in period 1 and withdrawing in period 2, when she
receives a signal equal to the cuto¤ point used by other patient depositors.
a(k) =
1
2"
Z
k + "
k   "(; k)d:
a(k) is increasing in k. This is because when we increase k, we shift the interval of
integration upwards. The distribution of n over the new interval of integration does not
change (n is distributed uniformly over [; 1]:). That is because the both the state of
the fundamentals and the cuto¤ point increase by the same amount. But over the new
interval of integration, we have higher p(). The higher probability of high asset return
increases the expected utility of withdrawing in period 2. Hence, a(k) is increasing in
k: If p() is strictly increasing over some part of the interval of integration, then a(k)
is strictly increasing.
If   ; the short-term liquidation value of the asset is R and p() = 1: Hence,
(; k) = u( (1 )R nc1
1 n )   u(c1): Since c1  (1   )R52; we have that (; k) > 0 for
   and a( + ") > 0: Let  be dened by p() = u(c1)=u( (1 ) c11  R): We can get
(; k) < 0 for  < . Hence, a(   ") < 0: From Lemma 2.1, we also know that a(k)
is continuous in k. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, we know that there is
a unique k such that (k; k) = 0:
52Consumption smoothing implies that c1 should never be larger than (1 )R which is the maximum
possible consumption of a patient depositor.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Let A1(k) be the set of the states of the fundamentals at which the bank
can satisfy all the withdrawal demand in period 1 by its own asset and no government
bailout is granted. We have A1(k) = f jn(; k)c1  (1  )g: Let A2(k) be the set
of the states of the fundamentals at which the bank cannot satisfy all of the withdrawal
demand in period 1 by itself. But with the bailout from the government, all the with-
drawal demand can be satised. We haveA2(k) = f
(1  ) < n(; k)c1  b+ (1  )g:
We know that (; k) < 0 for  2 [A1(k)]C and (; k) is strictly increasing
in  for  2 A1(k): Since (k; k) = 0, we must have that (1) A1(k) 6= ?. (2)
k + " 2 A1(k). (3) (k + "; k) > 0. (4) (k   "; k) < 0.
(1) First, we prove that (i; k) > 0 for i > k:
When k + 2" > i > k,
(i; k
)
= (i; k
) (k; k)
= 1
2"
R
i+"
k+"(; k
)d   1
2"
R
i "
k "(; k
)d:
For  2 [k + "; i + "]; n(; k) = : Hence, [k + "; i + "]  A1(k). Furthermore,
since (; k) is strictly increasing in  when  2 A1(k) and (k + "; k) > 0, we
have that 1
2"
R
i+"
k+"(; k
)d > 0: For  2 [k   "; i   "]; (; k) is either negative
(when  2 [A1(k)]C) or lower than (k + "; k) (when  2 A1(k)). So we must have
(i; k
) = 1
2"
R
i+"
k+"(; k
)d   1
2"
R
i "
k "(; k
)d > 0:
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When i  k + 2"; we have that n(; k) =  for  2 [i   "; i + "]. Hence,
[i   "; i + "]  A1(k). Since (; k) is strictly increasing in  for  2 A1(k), we
have (; k) > (k + "; k) > 0. Hence, (i; k) = 12"
R
i+"
i "(; k
)d > 0:
(2) Second, we prove that (i; k) < 0 for i < k
When k > i > k   2",
(i; k
)
= (i; k
) (k; k)
= 1
2"
R
k "
i " (; k
)d   1
2"
R
k+"
i+"
(; k)d:
For  2 [i   "; k   "], (i; k) < 0: This is because, if  2 [A1(k)]C ; we have that
(; k) < 0: If  2 A1(k); (; k) < (k "; k) < 0. Thus, we have 12"
R
k "
i " (; k
)d <
0. Furthermore, we must have that 1
2"
R
k+"
i+"
(; k)d  0. This can be proved by con-
tradiction. If 1
2"
R
k+"
i+"
(; k)d < 0, (k; k) = 0 requires that 1
2"
R
i+"
k "(; k
)d >
0, which means that i + " 2 A1(k) and (i + "; k) > 0. This implies that
[i + "; k
 + "]  A1(k) and (; k) > (i + "; k) > 0 for  2 [i + "; k + "],
which is a contradiction to 1
2"
R
k+"
i+"
(; k)d < 0:
When i  k 2", we have that (; k) < 0 for  2 [i "; i+"]. This is because,
If  2 [i  "; i+ "]\ [A1(k)]C , we have that (; k) < 0: If  2 [i  "; i+ "]\A1(k)
we have that (; k) < (k   "; k) < 0: Thus, (i; k) = 12"
R
i+"
i "(; k
)d < 0:
Proof of Corollary 2.1
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Proof. We know the relation between  and n from (8). It is convenient to write
(k; k) as an integration over n rather than . If 1   + b  c1; (k; k) is:
Z 1

[p((k; n))u(
1     nc1
1  n R)  u(c1)]dn
b does not appear in the expression. Hence, b does not a¤ect k.
If 1   + b < c1; (k; k) is equal to f(k;  ; c1; b) :
f(k;  ; c1; b) =
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)  u(c1)]dn
  R 1 +bc11 
c1
u(c1)dn 
R 1
1 +b
c1
1 +b
nc1
u(c1)dn
Since @f
@k > 0; to prove that
@k
@b
> 0, we only need to prove @f
@b
< 0:
@f
@b
= [  1
c1
+
1
c1
ln
1   + b
c1
+
1
c1
]u(c1) < 0
if 1 +b
c1
< 1:
Proof of Corollary 2.2
Proof. We prove the case of 1   + b < c1:The case of 1   + b  c1 can be proved
in a similar way, which is omitted here. (k; k) can be written as f(k;  ; c1; b):
f(k;  ; c1; b) =
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)  u(c1)]dn
  R 1 +bc11 
c1
u(c1)dn 
R 1
1 +b
c1
1 +b
nc1
u(c1)dn
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Since @f
@k > 0; we only have to prove
@f
@c1
< 0 and @f
@
< 0.
(1) Proof of @f
@c1
< 0 :
Let bf(k;  ; c1; b) = c1f(k;  ; c1; b): Since f(k;  ; c1; b) = 0; @f@c1 < 0 is equivalent to
@ bf
@c1
< 0:
@ bf
@c1
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
+ c1
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u0(1  nc1
1 n R)(  n1 n)R]dn
 [ + 1 +b
c1
]u(c1)
 [1   + b  c1   (1   + b) ln 1 +bc1 ]u0(c1)
Since the last two terms are negative, it is su¢ cient to prove that the sum of the
rst two terms is negative.
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R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
+c1
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u0(1  nc1
1 n R)(  n1 n)R]dn
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
+c1
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))
@u(
1  nc1
1 n R)
@n
(1 n)n
c1+ 1)dn
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
 c1p((k; ))u(1  c11  R) (1 )c1+ 1
 c1
R 1 
c1
 u(
1  nc1
1 n R)[p
0((k; n)) 2"
1 
(1 n)n
c1+ 1)
+p((k; n)) 1 2n
c1+ 1 ]dn
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=  c1p((k; ))u(1  c11  R) (1 )c1+ 1
  R 1 c1 [p((k; n))u(1  nc11 n R)1  2nc1c1+ 1 ]dn
+2"
R 1 
c1
 u(
1  nc1
1 n R)[p
0((k; n)) c1
1 
(1 n)n
c1+ 1 ]dn
=  c1p((k; ))u(1  c11  R) (1 )c1+ 1
 p((k; )) R 1 c1 [u(1  nc11 n R)1  2nc1c1+ 1 ]dn
+2"
R 1 
c1
 u(
1  nc1
1 n R)[p
0((k; n)) c1
1 
(1 n)n
c1+ 1
+
R n

p0((k; x))dx1  2nc1
c1+ 1 ]dn
The upper bound of the rst two term is p((k; ))u(1  c1
1  R): Hence, as "! 0
, @f
@c1
< 0:
(2) Proof of @f
@
< 0 :
Let ef = f
1 +b :
@ ef
@
=
@f
@
(1 +b)+f
(1 +b)2 : Since f(k
;  ; c1; b) = 0; to prove
@f
@
< 0; it is
su¢ cient to prove that @
ef
@
< 0:
(1   + b)2 @ ef
@
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
+(1   + b)[R 1 c1 [p((k; n))u0(1  nc11 n R)  11 nR]dn
+[ 
1 +b   1c1 ]
u(c1)
1 +b
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Since the last term is negative, it is su¢ cient to prove that the sum of the rst two
terms is negative.R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
+(1   + b)[R 1 c1 [p((k; n))u0(1  nc11 n R)  11 nR]dn
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
+(1   + b)[R 1 c1 [p((k; n))@u( 1  nc11 n R)@n (1 n)c1+ 1 ]dn
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)]dn
 (1   + b)p((k; ))u(1  c1
1  R)
(1 )
c1+ 1
 (1   + b) R 1 c1 u(1  nc11 n R)[p0((k; n)) 2"1  (1 n)c1+ 1)
 p((k; n)) 1
c1+ 1 ]dn
=
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)
c1+b
+c1 1 ]dn
 (1   + b)p((k; ))u(1  c1
1  R)
(1 )
c1+ 1
+(1   + b) R 1 c1 u(1  nc11 n R)p0((k; n)) 2"1  (1 n)c1+ 1dn
The rst term is strictly lower than
(
1  
c1
  )p((k; ))u(1     c1
1   R)
c1 + b
 + c1   1
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Since (c1 + b)(1 c1   ) < (1    + b)(1   ) , we have that the sum of the rst two
terms is negative. As "! 0, the third term ! 0: Hence, as "! 0 , @f
@
< 0:
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Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. We prove the general case when " is small but not equal to zero. Let us denote
the banks objective function as EUB(c1) :
EUB(c1)
=
R ee
0
[1 +b
c1
u(c1)]d
+
R eee [1 +bc1 u(c1)]d
+
R k+"e [nu(c1) + (1  n)p()u[1  nc11 n R]]d
+
R 
k+"[u(c1) + (1  )p()u[1  c11  R]]d
+
R 1

[u(c1) + (1  )u[ (1 )R c11  ]]d
where e is the state of the fundamentals at which the total withdrawal demand
equals the liquidation value of the bank in period 1. That is, n(e; k)c1 = 1    : ee is
the state of the fundamentals at which the total withdrawal demand equals the sum of
the liquidation value of the bank in period 1 and bailouts. That is n(ee; k)c1 = 1 +b:
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@EUB=@c1
=
R ee
0
1 +b
c1
[u0(c1)  u(c1)=c1]d
+
R eee 1 +bc1 [u0(c1)  u(c1)=c1]d
+
R k+"e [nu0(c1) + ( n)p()u0[1  nc11 n R]R]d
+1 
2"
@k
@c1
R k+"e [u(c1)  p()u[1  nc11 n R]
  1++c1
(1 n) Rp()u
0[1  nc1
1 n R]]d
+
R 
k+"[u
0(c1) + ( )p()u0[1  c11  R]R]d
+
R 1

[u0(c1) + ( )u0[ (1 )R c11  ]]d
By the denition of k; when c1 = 1   + b we have ee = k   ": Hence,
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@EUB=@c1

c1=1 +b
=
R k "
0
[u0(c1)  u(c1)=c1]d
+
R k+"
k " [nu
0(c1) + ( n)p()Ru0(c1R)]d
+1 
2"
@k
@c1
R k+"
k " [u(c1)  p()u(c1R)]d
+
R 
k+"[u
0(c1) + ( )p()Ru0(c1R)]d
+
R 1

[u0(c1) + ( )u0(R 1  c1)]d
When   b ; the second and fourth terms are positive since
c1 = 1   + b < 1
and
1 < bc1(b)  bc1():
The third term is zero by the denition of k. The last term is positive since R 
1  > 1:
As " ! 0; p(k) ! u(c1)=u( (1 ) c11  R) < u(1)=u( (1 ) 1  R): The last inequality
comes from the c1 = 1   + b < 1: Hence,
k < b:
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If b is su¢ ciently small, the rst term will be small and we have
@EUB=@c1
c1 = 1   + b > 0:
So the bank chooses a short-term payment c1 which is strictly larger than the sum of
the bailouts and the liquidation value of the banks asset (1   + b):
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. If b = 0, (17) implies that we must have u(c1)=c1 < v0(): By the concavity of
u and u(0) = 0; we know u0(c1) < u(c1)=c1. From (10), we know that the deposit-rate
o¤ered by the bank will satisfy u0(c1)  u0( (1 ) c11  R)RE[p() j > k ]: Hence, we
must have
u0(
(1  )  c1
1   R)RE[p() j > k
 ]  u0(c1) < v0(); (22)
which implies that (18) is negative. Thus, the government will choose zero bailout only
when  = 0. But since lim
!0
v0() = +1;  = 0 cannot be equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. I use  NC and cNC1 to denote the equilibrium choices of the government
and the bank when there is no commitment to the bailout level. The ex-post bailout
satises
v0( NC   bNC) = 1
cNC1
u(cNC1 ):
Suppose the government and the bank still choose  NC and cNC1 , but the govern-
ment can commit ex-ante to a certain bailout level b
C
. According to (17), we have
b
NC
> b
C
: In the post-deposit game, the run probability k is determined by
R 1 
c1
 [p((k
; n))u(1  nc1
1 n R)  u(c1)]dn
  R 1 +bc11 
c1
u(c1)dn 
R 1
1 +b
c1
1 +b
nc1
u(c1)dn = 0
Since b
NC
> b
C
; we have kNC > kC . That is, the ex-ante run probability is lower in
the commitment case than the no commitment case if the government and the bank
choose the same tax and short-term payment. Since the depositors welfare is given by
R k
0
1 +b
c1
u(c1)d +
R 1
k [u(c1) + (1  )p()u( (1 ) c11  R)]d
+
R k
0
v(   b)d + R 1
k v()d:
Higher run probability implies lower expected welfare. Hence, commitment can strictly
improve the ex-ante welfare even if the government chooses the same strategy. In
the commitment case, since the committed bailout level is strictly lower than the no
commitment case, the bank chooses a lower short-term deposit-rate according to (10).
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This will make the equilibrium bailout level and the run probability even lower in the
commitment case.
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3 Chapter 3: A Note on Equilibrium Bank Runs:
Robustness of the Two-Consumer Example
3.1 Introduction
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that a bank run can be an equilibrium to the con-
tract which supports the constrained-e¢ cient allocation in the post-deposit game.53
The important question to ask is whether or not consumers will want to deposit in the
bank if they expect bank runs occur. Peck and Shell (2003) answered this question by
analyzing the optimal contract in the full pre-deposit game in which runs are triggered
by sunspots.54 In Peck and Shells 2-consumer example, the contract will be charac-
terized by c which is the consumption received by the rst depositor in line in period
1.55 Let c(s) be the optimal contract o¤ered by the bank, where s is the probability
of a bank run. In the numerical example of Peck and Shell, c(s) is a step function: If
the probability s is less than a critical level s0, the contract c(s) tolerates runs and
c(s) = c(0). If the probability s is more than s0, the optimal contract will be immune
from runs and c(s) = cno run, the level at which rational consumers will never run.
The probability of a bank run s has only a bang-bange¤ect on the optimal contract
c(s).
One might think that if tolerating runs is still optimal, as the probability of a bank
run increases the optimal contract should give less to the rst depositor in the line and
reserve more for the second in line since a bank run is more likely.56 That is, one might
53To be more precise, it is the constrained-e¢ cient allocation in the post-deposit game when pre-
supposing no runs.
54The sunspot variable, , is distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 1]. For  < s; the run-
equilibrium in the post-depost game is chosen. For   s; the non-run-equilibrium in the post-depost
game is chosen.
55We use the same notation as Peck and Shell (2003).
56Dividing the resource equally is optimal when a bank run occurs.
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have conjectured that c(s) should be a decreasing function of s when s  s0. The
reason why the optimal contract is not always like this is that c(s) must satisfy the
incentive-compatibility constraint which induces a patient consumer to choose period
2 when other patient consumers do so. This constraint does not change with s. For
small s, that incentive-compatibility constraint may bind so c(s) is independent of s.
The numerical example in Peck and Shell (2003) has this property.
The present note provides a generalization of the Peck and Shells example. I
derive conditions on the parameters that are necessary for equilibrium bank runs.
For the parameters that permit tolerating bank runs, I derive the range in which
we have the Peck and Shells step-function result and the range in which the optimal
contract tolerating runs changes continuously in the run probability until it reaches the
threshold s0, at which the optimal contract switches to the best run-proof contract.
The implication of the latter case is that the run probability has greater inuence on
the deposit contract and resource allocation: it a¤ects not only whether bank runs will
be tolerated ( like Peck and Shells example ) but also how bank runs will be tolerated.
The next section analyzes the necessary conditions on the parameters to allow for
tolerating bank runs. Section 3.3 analyzes the range of these parameters for which c(s)
is a decreasing function of s for small s. Section 3.4 is for the concluding remarks.
3.2 Necessary Conditions For Equilibrium Bank Runs
We rst review the notation in the example of Peck and Shell (2003). The utility
function of the patient and impatient consumers are respectively
v(x) =
x1 b
1  b (23)
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and
u(x) = A
x1 a
1  a , where A  1: (24)
A reects the importance of impulse demandby the impatient consumers. We will
discuss this parameter in detail in the next section. a > 1 and b > 1 are the coe¢ cients
of risk aversion of the impatient and patient consumers respectively. Each consumer
is impatient with probability p and patient with probability (1   p). Types are un-
correlated and private information. Investing one unit of period 0 consumption yields
R > 1 units if harvested in period 2 and yields one unit if harvested in period 1. c is
the consumption received by the rst depositor in line in period 1.
We next dene run equilibriumin the post-deposit game.
Denition 3.1 (Peck-Shell (2003) Denition 1) Given a mechanism m 2 M ,57 the
post-deposit game is said to have a run equilibrium if there is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in which all consumers choose to withdraw in period 1, independent of the realization
of their types.
In the 2-consumer example, m is characterized by c. In the post-deposit game, the
impatient consumer always chooses to withdraw in period 1 since she values only the
period-1 consumption. For the patient consumer, given the expectation that the other
consumer will withdraw in period 1, her expected utility from withdrawing early is
[v(c) + v(2y   c)]=2. This is because she may be the rst or the second in the arrival
position. The probability of each case is 1=2. If she waits until period 2, she will get
v((2y   c)R). The run equilibrium exists in the post-deposit game if and only if the
patient consumer strictly prefers to withdraw in period 1. That is, if and only if we
57M is the set of the mechanisms which satisfy the resource constraint. The resource constraint is
equation (2) in Peck and Shell (2003).
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have
[v(c) + v(2y   c)]=2  v((2y   c)R) > 0: (25)
Withdrawing early is riskyfor the patient consumer: If she is the last in the queue,
she can only get (2y   c), which is less than what she can get if she waits, (2y   c)R.
Given v(c) = (c1 b   1)=(1  b), the patient consumer will never take the risk if she is
su¢ ciently risk averse.
Lemma 3.1 If b  1+ln 2= lnR, there is no run equilibrium in the post-deposit game.
Proof.
[v(c) + v(2y   c)]=2  v((2y   c)R)
=
[c1 b + (2y   c)1 b]=2  [(2y   c)R]1 b
(1  b)
=
 (c1 b)=2 + (2y   c)1 b(R1 b   1=2)
(b  1)
If (R1 b   1=2)  0, then we always have [v(c) + v(2y   c)]=2   v((2y   c)R)  0,
which implies there is no run equilibrium in the post-deposit game. The inequality
b  1 + ln 2= lnR is equivalent to the inequality (R1 b   1=2)  0:
Lemma 3.1 implies that a necessary condition for the existence bank run in the
post-deposit game is
b < 1 + ln 2= lnR. (26)
If (26) is satised, it can be seen that (25) is equivalent to
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c > cno run = 2y=[(2=Rb 1   1)1=(b 1) + 1]: (27)
Of course, the more important equilibrium concept is equilibrium in the pre-deposit
game.
Denition 3.2 (Peck-Shell (2003) Denition 2) Given a mechanism m 2 M , the
pre-deposit game is said to have a run equilibrium if there is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium in which (i) consumers are willing to deposit, and (ii) for some set of
realizations of  occurring with positive probability, all consumers choose to withdraw
in period 1, independent of the realization of their type.
The pre-deposit game has a run equilibrium only if there is a non-run equilibrium
in the post-deposit game. Otherwise, no consumer would deposit in the bank. The
non-run equilibrium in the post-deposit game is dened as the following.
Denition 3.3 Given a mechanism m 2 M , the post-deposit game is said to have a
non-run equilibrium if there is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which only the impatient
depositors choose to withdraw in period 1.
The impatient consumer always chooses to withdraw in period 1. For the patient
consumer, given the expectation that only the impatient consumer will withdraw in
period 1, her expected utility from withdrawal in period 1 is p[v(c)+v(2y c)]=2+(1 
p)v(c). If she waits until period 2, she will get pv((2y c)R)+(1 p)v(yR). The non-run
equilibrium exists in the post deposit game if and only if the patient consumer prefers
to withdraw in period 1. That is, the following incentive-compatibility constraint is
satised.
pv((2y   c)R) + (1  p)v(yR)  p[v(c) + v(2y   c)]=2  (1  p)v(c)  0: (28)
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The LHS of (28) is a continuous function of c. From (26), it is also decreasing in
c. When c = 0, the LHS of (28) is equal to +1 > 0. When c = 2y, the LHS of (28) is
equal to 1 < 0. Hence there is a unique c, 0 < c < 2y, such that inequality (28) holds
with equality. Denote that c by cIC : So the non-run equilibrium in the post-deposit
game exists if and only if we have
c  cIC : (29)
The superscript IC stands for the incentive compatibility constraint in the post-
deposit game which makes the patient consumer wait hence allows the non-run equi-
librium to exist. For there to be a run equilibrium in the pre-deposit game, we need
both the run equilibrium and the non-run equilibrium to exist in the post-deposit game.
Given (27) and (29), this is possible only if
cIC > cno run: (30)
It is equivalent to say the (28) is satised when c = cno run, that is, when we have
2=R
(2=Rb 1   1)1=(b 1) + 1 < 1: (31)
Inequalities (26) and (31) are necessary conditions for the existence of a bank-run
equilibrium in the pre-deposit game. Each of them is a restriction on the values of
the parameters R and b. The parameters which we have not discussed so far are a, y,
p and A. As the example in Peck and Shell, we set a = b. That is, the patient and
impatient consumer are the same in risk aversion. y is not essential for the optimal
contract since it will only change the scale of the economy. In the next section, we will
discuss how varying the parameters of A and p a¤ects the qualitative nature of the
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optimal contract.
3.3 The Parameters
In this section, we assume that the two necessary conditions (26) and (31) are satised
and a = b. We will discuss ranges of the other parameters, A and p, that can a¤ect
the nature of the optimal contract. We derive the ranges of A and p in which there is
bank-run equilibrium to the pre-deposit game and which can make c(s) a decreasing
function of s for small s when c(s) tolerates bank runs.
Using the same notation as Peck and Shell (2003), the ex ante consumer welfare, if
the non-run equilibrium is realized, is
cW (c;A; p) = p2[u(c)+u(2y c)]+2p(1 p)[u(c)+v((2y c)R)]+2(1 p)2v(yR): (32)
cW (c;A; p) is a concave function of c and it has a unique maximum point. Let c(A; p) =
argmax cW (c;A; p). c(A; p) is the rst-best solution for the deposit contract (i.e. the
optimal solution if consumerstypes are observed in period 1). Given the CRRA utility
function form, we have that
c(A; p) =
2y
fp=(2  p) + 2(1  p)=[(2  p)ARa 1]g1=a + 1 : (33)
Hence c is an increasing function of A: This is because ex-ante the impatient consumer
is more importantcompared to the patient consumer as A increases. So the bank
would like to give the rst consumer in period 1 (must be impatient ) more. c is also
an decreasing function of p: This is because as p increases it is more likely that both
consumers are impatient. When both consumers are impatient, the optimal resource
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allocation is to divide the resources equally among the two consumers.
Of course, consumer types are not observable by the bank, so we need to check
whether the incentive-compatibility constraint (29) is satised at c. That is, whether
the patient consumer wants to wait until period 2 given the expectation that others
will not run. And we also need to check whether a run equilibrium is possible.
When the -run equilibrium is realized, the ex ante consumer welfare is
W run(c) = p2[u(c) + u(2y   c)] + p(1  p)[u(c) + v(2y   c) + v(c) + u(2y   c)]
+(1  p)2[v(c) + v(2y   c)]: (34)
W run(c) is a concave function and the unique unconstrained optimal solution is y.
If the propensity to run is s, ex ante welfare for the pre-deposit game is
W (c; s; A; p) =
8><>: (1  s)
cW (c;A; p) + sW run(c;A; p) if cno run < c < cICcW (c;A; p) if c  cno run: (35)
Let c denote the optimal contract in the pre-deposit game,
c = argmax W (c; s; A; p):
For di¤erent values of A and p, c(s;A; p) has qualitively di¤erent properties as a
function of s.
Case 3.1 c(A; p)  cno run:
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c(1; p) < cno run and c(A; 1) < cno run. Hence we will have Case 3.1 when either
A is close to 1 or p is close to 1: That is, we will be in this case if the patient and
impatient are becoming equally importantor it is becoming more probable that both
consumers are impatient. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint will never
bind at the rst-best solution c. Furthermore, c(A; p)  cno run implies that there is
no run equilibrium in the post-deposit game. So we have that c(s;A; p) = c(A; p):
There is no run-equilibrium in the pre-deposit game. c does not depend s.
Example 3.1
a = b = 1:01; y = 3; R = 1:5;
p = 0:5;A = 1:
The values of b and R satisfy the necessary conditions in Section 3.2: cno run =
4:1560 < cIC = 4:2809: And we have c = 3 < cno run < cIC. So c = c = 3
Case 3.2 cno run < c(A; p)  cIC
As the impatient consumer gets more important(i.e. as A becomes larger) or it
is more likely to have at least one patient consumer (i.e. as p becomes smaller), the
rst best solution requires more insurance. Hence c will increase.
In this case, c(A; p) still satises the incentive compatibility constraint. But a run
equilibrium exists in the post deposit game at c(A; p). So the bank should compare
the contract which tolerates runs and the contract which is run-proof. The optimal
contract is the one which gives the higher expected utility.
The bank can rule out the run equilibrium by choosing c  cno run. Since cW (c) is
strictly increasing when c  c(A; p), the optimal contract to rule out runs is c = cno run.
Let the optimal contract which tolerates runs should be denoted by bc. Hence we
have
bc = argmax
c2[cno run;cIC ]
(1  s)cW (c;A; p) + sW run(c;A; p):bc(s;A; p): (36)
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bc(s;A; p) is a decreasing function of s. And when s = 0; bc(0;A; p) = c(A; p). Clearly,
W (bc(); s; A; p) is a decreasing function of s.
W (bc(); 0; A; p) = cW (c;A; p) > cW (cno run;A; p) (37)
and
W (bc(); 1; A; p) =W run(cno run;A; p) < cW (cno run;A; p): (38)
So there exists a unique 0 < s < 1 such thatW (bc(); s; A; p) = cW (cno run;A; p). Denote
this s by s0.
If s > s0, c = cno run and there is no run equilibrium in the pre-deposit game. If
s < s0, c(s;A; p) = bc(s;A; p); for s < s0, there is a run equilibrium in the pre-deposit
game and c is a decreasing function of s. For s = s0, both the run-proof contract,
cno run, and the contract tolerating runs bc(s;A; p) are optimal.
Example 3.2 We use the same parameter values as in Example 3.1 except that A
has been increased to A = 9. The values of cno run and cIC are unchanged, since
they dont depend on A. We have cno run < c = 4:2531 < cIC, s0 = 0:0027, and
c(s) = cno run = 4:1560 for s  s0, and c(s) > cno run and strictly decreasing in s
for s < s0. Figure 3.1 shows c(s):
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Figure 3.1: c(s) in Case 2
Case 3.3 cIC < c(A; p)
c(1; 0) > cIC . Hence we have this case for su¢ ciently large A and su¢ ciently low
p. The rst-best solution c(A; p) does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
So as s! 0, the incentive compatibility constraint will bind and bc(s;A; p) = cIC . Let
s1 = maxfs : bc(s;A; p) = cICg. That is, if s  s1 the incentive constraint will bind
and the optimal contract which tolerates bank runs equals cIC . If s > s1, the incentive
constraint will not bind and the optimal contract which tolerates bank runs is lower
than cIC and is a decreasing function of s.
As in Case 3.2, bank runs can be ruled out by setting c = cno run. The bank will
compare the best run-proof contract with the best run-tolerating contract and choose
the one that gives the greater ex-ante utility. Let s0 be the cut-o¤ point between
the best run-proof contract and the best run-tolerating contract W (bc(); s0; A; p) =cW (cno run;A; p).
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If s1  s0, we have that c(s;A; p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
cIC if s  s0bc(s;A; p) < cIC if s0 < s  s1
cno run if s1 < s.
If s1 < s0, we have that c(s;A; p) =
8><>: c
IC if s  s1
cno run if s1 < s.
Example 3.3 We use the same parameter values as Example 3.1 except that A is
further increased to A = 10:5. The values of cno run and cIC do not change since they do
not depend on A. We have cno run < cIC < c = 4:2851 and s1 = 0:0031 < s0 = 0:0047:
For s  s1; we have c(s) = cIC = 4:2809: For s1 < s < s0; we have cno run < c(s) <
cIC and that c is strictly decreasing in s: For s  s0, we have c(s) = cno run = 4:1560.
Figure 3.2 displays the optimal contract as a function of s.
Figure 3.2: c(s) in Case 3
Example 3.4 We use the same parameter values as Example 3.1 except that A is
increased even further to A = 12. The values of cno run and cIC are unchanged. We
have cno run < cIC < c = 4:3094 and s1 = 0:0209 > s0 = 0:0064: For s  s0; we have
c(s) = cIC = 4:2809: For s  s0, we have c(s) = cno run = 4:1560.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
This note generalizes the 2-consumer example in Peck and Shell (2003). I derive nec-
essary conditions for equilibrium bank runs. For the parameters that permit tolerating
bank runs, I derive the range in which we have the Peck and Shells step-function result
and the range in which the optimal contract tolerating runs changes continuously in the
run probability until it reaches the threshold at which the optimal contract switches to
the best run-proof contract. Hence, the run probability a¤ects not only whether bank
runs will be tolerated but also how bank runs will be tolerated.
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